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REFORMULATING NATIVE TITLE IN MABO'S WAKE:
ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY AND RECONCILIATION IN
POST-CENTENARY AUSTRALIA
Carlos Scott L6pezt
I. INTRODUCTION AND RECENT CURRENT EVENTS
Few issues have spurred more vigorous debate among Australia's
citizenry than Native Title and, more broadly, the roles of Native
Australians.' Like most former colonial outposts, the settlement of
the Australian continent was marked by nothing less than an
invasion by a European power (Great Britain), which subsequently
imposed its will on the Native Peoples living in its newly "discovered"
lands. These peoples were viewed as largely uncivilized and in need
of protection. Hundreds of years later the debate continues over how
to reconcile the present with the past.
'Co-Director, Jerome Frank Legal Services Organization at The Yale Law School
(New Haven, CT, USA) and formerly with the Refugee Advice and Casework Service
(Sydney, New South Wales, Australia) and the Refugee and Immigration Legal
Centre (Melbourne, Victoria, Australia). The author would like to thank Prof. Steven
Gunn (The Yale Law School) for his input and perspectives on property laws for
Native Peoples. Author's Notes: The terms "Native Title," "Native Peoples," and
"Indigenous Peoples" are capitalized at all times, reflecting the deserved status these
words are accorded by Australia's Indigenous and Native Peoples (and the author of
this paper). The pronoun "his" is used to refer to decisions by individual government
ministers who have all been male, though it is fully likely these ministers may
someday be women. Many British spelling conventions are used in this paper,
consistent with current practice throughout the states and territories of the
Commonwealth of Australia. The author has included several significant quotes on
Native Title in Exhibit 15 in the Appendix.
1. "Native Australians" are also often called "Aborigines," though this paper prefers
the former term to the latter given the racist and prejudicial undertones which still
accompany "Aborigine." I look forward to the day when this is not the case; however,
given the fact that the term "Aborigine" has yet to be reappropriated and fully
redefined by Australia's Native Peoples, it is eschewed here.
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Dramatic changes loomed on the horizon with the High Court's
ruling in Mabo v. Queensland,2 which recognized the existence of
Native Title in Australia and debunked the notion of terra nullius
(literally "land belonging to no one"), which had previously dominated
Australian jurisprudence vis-h-vis Native lands. Heralded as "one of
the most significant court decisionfs] in Australia's history[,]'3 it was
seen as a means for Native People to claim title over the lands that
had been taken away, regain rights that previously had been denied,4
and help end the increasing destruction of, and "injusticefs]" against,
Aboriginal culture.5
Others, however, were less sanguine. Indeed, nestled in Mabo
was an "out" for the government to extinguish Native Title, reflecting
the justified fears of Native and non-Native Australians alike that the
chaos instigated by a true "judicial" revolution would benefit
nobody-not the least of whom Native Peoples seeking a bona fide
resolution of past ills. This resolution involved more than just land
rights, but a sense of respect and dignity accompanying a state of true
reconciliation. In the years that followed, the High Court's decision
was used as a basis to legislate, litigate, arbitrate, mediate, and
negotiate Native Title claims, leaving some critics to wonder if
Australia would have been better off had Mabo never been decided.
Some critics focused on the impracticality-if not impossibility-of
even attempting to create a system in which the "joint" interests of
2. See 175 CLR 1.
3. PETER BuTT & ROBERT EAGLESON, MABO: WHAT THE HIGH COURT SAID AND WHAT
THE GOVERNMENT DID 92 (1996); see also PETER BUTT & ROBERT EAGLESON, MABO,
WIK & NATIVE TITLE (1998); see also Charles Edwards, Australia: Accommodating
Multiculturalism in Law, in STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS: MIXED AND MIXING 53 (Esin
Oricu et al eds., 1996) (referring to Mabo as a "landmark case" leading to a raising of
the "status of Aboriginal people in Australia").
4. See M. A. STEPHENSON, MABO: A JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1993) [hereinafter
MABO]; see also HENRY REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY: THREE NATIONS, ONE
AUSTRALIA? 40 n.3 (1996) [hereinafter THREE NATIONS]; see also NONIE SHARP, No
ORDINARY JUDGMENT: MABO, THE MURRAY ISLANDERS' LAND CASE (1996).
5. C. D. ROWLEY, THE DESTRUCTION OF ABORIGINAL SOCIETY 288 (1970). One could
also argue that an injustice simply exists in the way in which Aboriginals are often
associated with criminals. See Howard Sercombe, The Face of the Criminal is
Aboriginal, in CULTURES OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 76
(1995); see also Exhibit 41 (illustrating, with hindsight, the absurdity of the idea of
terra nullius); see also KATHY LASTER, LAW AS CULTURE 153 (1997). What is most
ironic is the observation that "available evidence suggests that the aborigines were
among the most unwarlike folk known to history." Id. See also Russel Ward, The
Social Fabric, in THE PATTERN OF AUSTRALIAN CULTURE 12 (1963).
[Vol. 11.1
MABO'S WAKE
Native and non-Native peoples could be fairly accommodated .
Conversely, other critics felt it could be done, though they cynically
viewed the government as simply caving into "mining companies,
pastoralists, and international capital[,]" such that Native Title in
Australia would "turn out to be some kind of shell game: now you see
it, now you don't."7 Others, finally, simply took issue with the
extraordinary resources being wasted to manage and process Native
Title claims, noting that Native Title needed to be determined "in a
new and less costly way.
'
The following paper addresses the problems with the way in
which Native Title has been conceived in Australia through the lenses
of: (a) key Australian court decisions, (b) Australian native title
legislation, and (c) international legal precedents addressing
aboriginal title and indigenous land rights. It is divided into five key
parts. Part I, which concludes here, outlines the debate in Australia
and the problems that have arisen since the High Court decided
Mabo. Part II focuses on the history, holdings, and specific problems
ensuing from the High Court's decision in Mabo and its predecessor,
Wik, which have provided the locus of Native Title debates and
largely explain why things have evolved as they have. Part III
examines events following Mabo and Wik, focusing largely on the
Native Title Act of 1993 (NTA), Native Title Amendment Act of 1998
(NTAA), and the most recent High Court decisions of Ward9 and
Wilson" addressing Native Title in Australia. These illustrate the
extent to which Mabo's critics' worst fears have come predictably to
fruition. Part IV considers alternative approaches to achieving full
reconciliation in particular light of the ways in which Australia's
Native People view their lands, and how this contrasts with the
situation of Native Peoples in other countries. Indeed, while court
decisions and legislation have come down supporting the rights of the
Awas Tingni (Nicaragua), Delgamuukw (Canada), Maori (New
6. See Steven Mark, Harmonization or Homogenization? The Globalization of Law
and Legal Ethics-An Australian Viewpoint, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1173 (2001)
(commenting on how globalization and civilized society necessitates legal systems
which protect property and proprietary rights in standardized fashions).
7. Peter Poynton, Mabo: Now You See It, Now You Don't!, in 35 RACE AND CLASS 41,
55 (1994).
8. Kerry Taylor, Land Ruling Spurs Disenchantment, THE AGE-MELBOURNE, Aug.
9, 2002, available at httpJ/www.theage.com.au/articles/200208/08/1028157989159.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
9. Western Australia v. Ward (2002) HCA 28.
10. Wilson v. Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313.
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Zealand), Sdmi (Norway), and even British Peoples (United Kingdom),
these fail to address the unique issues affecting Australia's Native
Peoples. This discussion concludes that the ways Australia has
conceived Native Title, while firmly grounded on well-settled
principles of international law, fails to account for the unique
relationship which Australia's Native Peoples have with their land-
and that a different approach is needed for true reconciliation. The
upshot is a new approach to managing Native Title in Australia which
is both firmly grounded in well-understood "tried-and-true" concepts
of property law, while accurately recognizing the prerequisites for
ensuring the dignity and rights of Native and non-Native Australians
alike. Part V concludes that now is the time to begin openly
discussing how and why current attempts at reconciliation-and
recognizing Native Title in Australia-need to be reformulated in
novel, albeit not necessarily unfounded ways.
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: MABO AND WIK
The editors of the Cairns Post opined that Mabo was a
"complicated judgment on Native Title handed down by the High
Court," clarifying "some rights," though also necessitating "cheaper
and less time-consuming ways to resolve Title." In doing so, they
succinctly summarized what had been unseen when Mabo was
decided: that within its austere holding were the seeds of failure. In
Mabo, the High Court held:
[Tihe common law of [Australia] recognizes a form of native title
which, in the cases where it has not been extinguished, reflects the
entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in accordance with their
laws or customs, to their traditional lands and that ... in
accordance with their laws or customs [the land] is preserved, as
native title, under the law .... "
In fact, before Mabo Native Peoples had been negotiating one-on-
one with various state and territory governments (STGs) in attempts
to determine what lands, if any, they could lay claim to.1" Mabo's
11. Complex Judgment, THE CAIRNS POST, Aug. 9, 2002, at 11.
12. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 15.
13. See National Archives of Australia, available at http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/
text-only/explore/picture-album/cth-pics.htm (depicting a pictographic history of the
key events leading up to Mabo in Native People's fight for Native Title in Australia)
(last visited Nov. 29, 2003); see also Photo, available at http://www.founding
dos.gov.au/explore/picture-album/cth-pics/icth-72J1971.jpg (illustrating Yolungu
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"promise" was that inconsistencies among states would be resolved;
however, it did not necessarily lay a clear groundwork for doing so,
except through further litigation and potential legislation. It was not
long before Mabo's promise was arguably "broken" and Native Title
"had not delivered a new relationship"14 to Australia's Native Peoples.
There is no doubt that Mabo, and to a lesser extent its successor,
Wik, altered the basis of Australian land law and distanced Australia
from its British origins. The cases did not, however, accord equal
recognition to indigenous property rights on par with other rights,
such as the right to equal suffrage. Moreover, the cases never
recognized Indigenous Sovereignty, which Nehal Bhuta has argued is
an essential prerequisite of banishing "the shadowy, ghostlike
survival" of feudal doctrines in Australian land law.' 5 By more closely
examining the historical context and key holdings of these two cases,
one can see more clearly why this is the current state of affairs. One
can also more readily understand why subsequent legislation and
High Court decisions have been unsuccessful in resolving the inherent
difficulties which have resulted and, in essence, have wrested
themselves free of their own self-imposed constraints.
A. Historical Context & Key Holdings
Understanding the limitations of Mabo and Wik requires that one
first understand the context from which they stemmed. As early as
1982, Native Peoples began pursuing their right to land in Australia's
courts, largely under the aegis of the Aboriginal Land Fund
Commission, which had been granted Parliamentary authority to
plaintiffs from Yirrkala at the ACT Supreme Court in Sept. 1970) (last visited Nov.
29, 2003); see also Photo, available at http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/explore/
picture-albumlcth-pics/iLcthl8_72_1992a.jpg (illustrating Eddie Mabo at home on
the island of Mer in the Torres Strait during the Mabo (No. 2) proceedings at the
High Court, 1992) (last visited Nov. 29, 2003); see also Photo, available at
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/explore/picture-album/cth-pics/i-cthl5-72-1974b.jpg
(illustrating tent embassy set up by Aboriginal Peoples on the lawns in front of
Parliament House during Australia Day celebration, 1972, twenty years before the
Mabo decision) (last visited Nov. 29, 2003); see also Photo, available at
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/explorelpicture-album/nt-pics/i-nt_72_1984ULuru.jpg
(illustrating Pitjantjatjara dancers at the "hadnback" of Uluru to the Mutijulu, 1984)
(last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
14. Native Title and the Treaty Dialogue, Sept. 26, 2002, at http://www.ila.org.au/
news/HREOC%2ONative%2OTitle%20and%20the%20Treaty%20Dialogue.PDF (last
visited Nov. 13, 2003).
15. Nehal Bhuta, Mabo, Wik and the Art of Paradigm Management, 22 MELB. U. L.
REv. 24, 27 (1998).
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purchase Crown leases for the use of Native Peoples with the assent
of STGs. In 1982, Queensland denied a land request by the
Koowarta People and others in the Winychanam Group because
"sufficient land in Queensland is already reserved and available for
the use and benefit of the Aborigines." 7 The Koowarta sued 8 on the
grounds that the denial was inconsistent with the Racial
Discrimination Act of 1975 (RDA). In essence, the denial was based
on a racial distinction, which the Act sought to prevent."' Absent a
bill of rights,' ° the RDA was key to the Koowarta People's claim, and
the Court upheld the RDA's use by a vote of 4-3. The court reasoned
it was within Parliament's authority under the Constitution's
16. Queensland plays prominently as a defendant in a large number of Native Title
cases, partly resulting from the significant amount of potential Native Title land
under its vast jurisdiction and its resulting conservative, xenophobic politics. See
Exhibit 1, noted in the Appendix (illustrating the success of the expressly xenophobic
One Nation Party in the most recent Australian Federal Election on Nov. 10, 2001).
See also Australia Surveying and Land Information Group, available at
http://www.askasia.org/image/maps/austral.htm (illustrating the comparatively large
size of Queensland) (last visited Dec. 1, 2003) [hereinafter Australia Surveying].
17. Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 187 (emphasis added).
18. Id.
19. At issue were §§ 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act of 1975, which read:
§ 9. Racial Discrimination to be Unlawful. (1) It is unlawful for a
person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of any human
right or fundamental freedom in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.
§ 12. Land, Housing and other Accommodation. (1) It is unlawful for
a person, whether as a principal or agent: (a) to refuse or fail to
dispose of any estate or interest in land, or any residential or
business accommodation, to a second person; ... by reason of the
race, colour or national or ethnic origin of that second person or of
any relative or associate of that second person.
Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, §§ 9, 12 (Austl.) [hereinafter RDA].
20. Whether Australia should adopt a Bill of Rights is an area of considerable
debate, as the conference sponsored by the Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law
and the University of New South Wales on June 21, 2002, at the New South Wales
Parliament House, illustrates well. See also MURRY R. WILCOX, AN AUSTRALIAN
CHARTER OF RIGHTS (1993) (discussing the benefits and costs of a bill of rights from a
federal judge's point of view); see also GEORGE WILLIAMS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR
AuSTRALiA 35-36 (2000) (outlining the key arguments for and against a bill of rights).
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external affairs power21 to enact legislation giving effect to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,22 which Australia ratified in 1975. Thus, the Court
upheld the RDA (though more on procedural grounds than the fact it
saw itself doing "the right thing").
Just three years later, the tides were reversed when a non-Native
Australian, Robert John Brown, attempted to use the RDA to defend
his rights to enter land which had been set aside for the Pitjantjatjara
People under the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act of 1981.2 Section 10
of the RDA held that individuals had the right to equality before the
law,24 and Mr. Brown argued that because he had been denied
entrance to the Pitjantjatjara land on the basis of his race (i.e., a non-
Native), he had clearly been denied equal treatment. In a unanimous
decision and in a significantly conciliatory tone, the High Court ruled
that the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act was valid in the degree to
which it satisfied section 8(1) of the RDA25 as an "appropriate
21. Australian Constitution s 51 (xxix).
22. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, opened for signature Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter
Convention on Elimination of Discrimination].
23. See Gerhardy v. Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70.
24. Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, § 10 (Austl.).
§ 10. Rights to equality before the law.
(1) If, by reason of, or of a provision of, a law of the Commonwealth or
of a State or Territory, persons of a particular race, colour or national
or ethnic origin do not enjoy a right that is enjoyed by persons of
another race, colour or national or ethnic origin, or enjoy a right to a
more limited extent than persons of another race, colour or national
or ethnic origin, then, notwithstanding anything in that law, persons
of the first-mentioned race, colour or national or ethnic origin shall,
by force of this section, enjoy that right to the same extent as persons
of that other race, colour or national or ethnic origin.
Id.
25. Id. § 8(1). This section of the RDA was based on Article 1, Paragraph 4 of the
Convention on Elimination of Discrimination which states:
(4) Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate
advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals
requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure
such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human
rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial
discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different
racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives
for which they were taken have been achieved.
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remedial step for a disadvantaged racial group."26 Thus, the High
Court upheld the legitimacy of affirmative action in Australia. As the
Court wrote, "[a] racial minority which wishes to preserve its own
identity may need particular supports to preserve that identity, and it
may need to preserve that identity if its members are not to be
disadvantaged in the society of which it is a part."2 The seeds of the
Court's openness to Native Peoples and their needs had been sown.
Similar reasoning led the Court to strike down the Queensland
Coast Islands Declaratory Act of 198521 in what is termed "Mabo no.
1," the precursor to the ultimate Mabo decision (i.e., "Mabo no. 2" or
"Mabo").29 This time, however, the Court's vote was divided 4-3 and
was grounded less on the RDA, per se, and more on Constitutional
Provisions requiring that Commonwealth Legislation trump State
Legislation if inconsistencies arose.30  Essentially, the Queensland
legislation addressed in Mabo no. 1 did not involve the state setting
aside land for Native Peoples, but instead involved the State excising
land for Native Peoples (i.e., preventing Native Peoples from having
rights to the land). The legislation, in specifically declaring that "any
rights that Torres Strait Islanders had to land after the claim of
sovereignty in 1879 [are] hereby extinguished without
compensation,"" had been passed in direct response to Eddie Mabo's
efforts to claim ownership of lands on Mer Island in the Torres Strait
nestled between the Australian mainland and Papua New Guinea.
After the High Court remanded the case to the Supreme Court of
Queensland to determine the facts on which the case was based, the
State Parliament swung into action and passed the legislation in the
hopes that the case would not ever make it back to the High Court. It
was because the legislation applied only to lands inhabited by the
Torres Strait Indigenous Peoples that the Court found it unjustifiably
racially limited in its scope.
Eddie Mabo did make it back to the High Court, where the Court
in Mabo ruled 6-1 that the Meriam people were entitled to the
Convention on Elimination of Discrimination, supra note 22, art. 1, para. 4.
26. Australian Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Landmark Cases Under The Racial Discrimination Act 1975, at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/racial-discrimination/guidelaw/landmark.html (last visited
Nov. 3, 2003) [hereinafter HREOC No. 1].
27. Gerhardy, 159 CLR at 136.
28. Mabo v. Queensland (1989) 166 CLR 186.
29. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
30. See Australian Constitution s 109.
31. Queensland Coast Islands Declaratory Act, 1985 (Austl.)
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possession, use, occupation, and enjoyment of most of the land of the
Murray Islands. In upholding the claims of Eddie Mabo and his co-
plaintiffs, the majority rejected the traditional doctrine that Australia
was terra nullius (literally "land belonging to no one") at the time of
European settlement. Instead, the High Court recognized Australia
to have been occupied by Native Peoples at the time of European
settlement.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority of the High Court
essentially used the RDA as a springboard to determine that
Australia's common law recognizes a form of "Native Title" to land.
Therefore, pre-existing land rights survived colonization and may still
exist today. Such "Native Title" is governed by the customs and laws
of Native Peoples where they can demonstrate that "their traditional
connexion [sic] with the land has been substantially maintained
3 2
and, most notably, where their "title has not been extinguished, ' 3 by
legislation or any action of the government executive "inconsistent
with 3 4 that Native Title.35 Neither the establishment of the colonies
nor the annexation of the three islands of the Meriam people by
Queensland extinguished the title of the former users and occupiers of
the land to exercise rights over that land according to native customs
or laws.
Mabo was radical36 because it recognized indigenous people had
prior title to land taken by the Crown since Cook's declaration of
possession in 1770. However, there was one key caveat: Native Title
only remained where it had not been legally extinguished by some
other means. 37 In some ways Mabo was revolutionary: in discarding
terra nullius, the court admitted a legal fiction which was highly
discriminatory and inconsistent with international law, thus
providing the inklings of a cultural evolution in the Court's ability to
accommodate Native People's needs. Advocates of Native Peoples'
rights were further heartened by its likely: (a) social outcomes,
32. Mabo, 175 CLR at 66.
33. Id. at 69.
34. Id. at 2.
35. See HREOC No. 1, supra note 26 (discussing the import of Mabo v. Queensland
[No 2] in Australian law vis-bA-vis human rights).
36. See R. Nicholson, Cartoon, THE AGE, May 25, 1993, at 16; see also R. Nicholson, 2
LEGAL SERVICES BULLETIN 138 (1976) (containing political cartoons depicting the
ridicule levied at Courts' attempts to employ arguably novel judicial interpretations
in their decisions).
37. See Mabo v. Queensland No. 2 1992 (Cth) - Significance of the Mabo Decision, at
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/places/cth/cthl8.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
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especially in the degree to which it recognized that the traditions and
laws of Native Peoples were worthy of equal respect to those of the
dominant culture; (b) economic implications, in that it gave Native
Peoples the ability to control a valuable asset such as land; and (c)
political power, specifically in recognizing that traditional Native
Peoples' decision making structures revolved around land.38
On the other hand, the fact that Mabo contained "legal armature"
to extinguish Native Title, especially in the degree to which such title
was broadly and poorly defined, suggested there was little "room to
deliver real outcomes." 9 In the years that followed one could argue
that discrimination against Native Peoples was not abated, but
exacerbated by Mabo's holding, primarily because Mabo threatened
the security of non-Native Australians who sought to retain their
land.40  Most ironically, the bases on which Native Title was thus
fought, the RDA, were the very bases eroded by Mabo. This is
illustrated in the extent to which non-Native Australians saw the
RDA giving Native Peoples additional rights under the common law.41
It would not be long before Mabo's grand vision of Native Title became
swallowed up by legislation and legal minutia with "fast tracking"
development plans through a bludgeoned bureaucracy taking
precedence over detailed assessments of the plans' effects on Native
Peoples.42
38. See Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Summary
of Native Title Report: 2001, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social-justice/ntreport_01/
summary.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter Native Title Summary].
39. Id.
40. See Indigenous People and Racism in Australia: Issues and International
Commentary, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/socialjustice/nt issues/IWGIA.pdf (last
updated Oct. 7, 2003); see also HREOC, Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Social
Justice, Native Title, at http://www.hreoc.gov.aulsocial-justice/native-title/index.html
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003).
41. See Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of
Indigenous Peoples' Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 189 (2001). Benedict Kingsbury writes how Native Peoples are currently
able to claim Native Title on a variety of bases today, lending credence to the
argument that the Court's ruling in Mabo exceeded the scope of the RDA. These
bases include (a) human rights & non-discrimination; (b) minority status; (c) self-
determination rights; (d) historic sovereignty bases; and (e) claims as Indigenous
people, including claims based on treaties or other agreements. He does not comment
on the potential of other claims, such as current implied sovereignty, which is
discussed as a possible future-and arguably more stable-option in Part IV of this
paper. Id.
42. See Native Title Summary, supra note 38.
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Future court cases served to define more clearly what
extinguished Native Title. In Wik,43 the High Court made two
dramatic holdings. First, it said that Native Title could coexist with
pastoral leases, 4 leading directly to fears of property devaluation,
concerns over the extent of property claims, and worries over frivolous
claims.45 Second, the Court held that when Pastoral Leases and other
statutes addressing land interests expire, the Crown does not
necessarily acquire "reversionary interest which entails full beneficial
ownership and control exclusive of Native Title."" In other words, it
was not clear who controlled the land. Determining control would be
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Fortunately, Wik did establish a
proviso that "in the event that Native Title is inconsistent with
pastoral leases, pastoral interests should prevail."'" Still, the Court's
tenor in discussing non-Native Peoples "prevailing" over Native
Peoples suggested that reconciliation was fast becoming an impossible
dream.
43. Wik v. Queensland (1996) 63 FCR 450.
44. Leasehold lands currently make up forty-two percent-or about half-of
Australia's entire landmass, with most of this pastoral leasehold. Garth Nettheim,
Responding to Wik: First, Define the Problem, INDIGENOUS L. BULL., Apr. 1997, at 14-
15, (referencing the Australian Surveying and Land Information Group as of 1994),
construed in Gary D. Meyers & Sally Raine, Australian Aboriginal Land Rights in
Transition (Part II): The Legislative Response to the High Court's Native Title
Decisions in Mabo v. Queensland and Wik v. Queensland, 9 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
95, 105 n.55 (2001).
45. One of the most publicized cases was that of the Larrakia People who claimed all
undeveloped Crown land in Darwin and its environs, including Bicentennial Park in
Darwin's business district. A second, highly publicized claim was that of the Yorta
Yorta People to 10,000 km' of land (including four state forests & four major rivers),
as well as compensation for 16,000 km2 of land lost to freehold title. Ultimately, the
full Federal Court struck down the Yorta Yorta claim in The Members of the Yorta
Yorta Aboriginal Community v. The States of Victoria & Ors (1998) 1606 FCA 1. See
Darrin Farrant & Peter Gregory, Yorta People Thrown a Lifeline, THE AGE, Feb. 9,
1991; see also Wayne Atkinson, Yorta Yorta Struggle for Justice Continues, available
at http://home.vicnet.net.au/-aar/yorta.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003); see also Rod
Hagen, Yorta Yorta Native Title Hearings: A Daily Commentary on the Progress of
Justice, Web Publication of MMG, at http://www.mountainman.com.au/yorta.html
(last updated Nov. 7, 1996); see also Mixed Fortunes and Two Appeals in the Federal
Court, ATSC NEWSWIRE No. 42, Sept. 1999, at 19, available at http:/indigenous.
gibsonnet.net/yorta2.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
46. Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 105 n.58.
47. Gilda C. Rodriguez, Note, Wik Peoples v. State of Queensland: A Restrained
Expansion of Aboriginal Land Rights, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 711, 734
(1998).
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Wik was criticized even more than Mabo.48 It set the stage for
legislative initiatives that would ultimately erode the hope Mabo
provided to Native Peoples and the durability of Native Title.
B. Ensuing Problems
The ensuing problems from Mabo and Wik are multifaceted,
though inevitably they stem from the amorphous concept of Native
Title, which the Court failed to define in any significant or durable
sense. On the one hand Mabo can be faulted for addressing Native
Title only vis-A-vis limited "title" rights, failing to address explicitly
issues such as hunting and fishing rights; water and sea rights;
mining and ore rights; and, most important, coexistence with Pastoral
Leases. The Court might be given credit for wanting to avoid such
specificity in the interest of not appearing legislative, respecting the
separation of powers ingrained in the Australian Constitution.
However, the pretentious language reflected a self-awareness of its
radical holding-a holding which it reasonably should have predicted
would demand further guidance. In this light, the High Court's
greatest failure was not discussing more explicitly the terms under
which Native Title could be extinguished, ultimately appearing
"undecided [about Native Title's existence] ... pre-Mabo, where
[Native Title] may continue to exist within Australia, and how existing
Native Title could be claimed or extinguished."4 9 This lack of any
"comprehensive statement" regarding the "nature of Aboriginal title"0
is thus egregious, with Wik only serving to undermine any further
attempts at certainty5 1 with its failure to address how lands should be
managed which might conclusively not be owned by anybody at all.5'
Mabo also appears to contradict itself with regards to Native
Title, as if the Court wanted to have its cake and eat it too. On the
48. Robert S. French, Wik and Beyond-An Overview of the Proposed Amendments
to the Native Title Act of 1993, in IN THE WAKE OF WIK: OLD DILEMMAS; NEW
DIRECTIONS IN NATIVE TITLE LAW 111, 119 (Gary D. Meyers ed., 1999) (commenting
the ferocity of the reaction in the Mabo decision paled in comparison to the response
when Wik was handed down), construed in Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 114
n.95.
49. See Michael Legg, Indigenous Australians and International Law: Racial
Discrimination, Genocide and Reparations, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 387, 403 (2002)
(emphasis added).
50. Julie Cassidy, Aboriginal Title: "An Overgrown and Poorly Excavated
Archeological Site"?, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 39, 40 (1998).
51. Legg, supra note 49, at 405.
52. See FRANK BRENNAN, THE WIK DEBATE: ITS IMPACT ON ABORIGINES, PASTORALISTS,
AND MINERS 38-43 (1998).
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one hand, "indigenous interests are not defined by reference to the
rights or interests in land which form the law of real property at
common law," 3 due to the simple fact that Native Title is unique and
reflects a sui generis set of rights that are "not confined to interests
which were analogous to common law concepts or estate in land or
proprietary rights. ' ' On the other hand, the High Court noted Native
Title "may conform to traditional common law concepts of rights and
interests in land."5' One wonders how Native Title is to be best
understood. Is it true that the rights at one time transcended the
common law, but they do not anymore? Or is it true that, even today,
Native Title rights are "special rights" with a "special place" in
common law which are ideally viewed as transcending the law?
Indeed, pre-existing interests of Native Title are "presumed to survive
the assertion of sovereignty" in a form that transcends the common
law, unless "expressly confiscated at that time or extinguished or
expropriated by legislation thereafter."5 6 But if this is the case, then
there is reason to worry if they are left ill defined.
The Court could be given credit for attempting to define Native
Title better in the years following Mabo, though these attempts
proved fruitless. In Fejo v. Northern Territory of Australia,57 the
Court held that previous freehold expressly extinguishes Native Title.
This was followed in Yarmirr v. Northern Territory,58 in which the
Court held no Native Title existed over any seas abutting the
Northern Territory because this conflicted with common law public
rights to navigate and fish, as well the international right of "innocent
passage." 9 What these cases illustrated, however, was less what
defined the "novel" idea of "Native Title" and more how the potentially
novel idea of Native Title was not novel at all. The Court simply said
what Native Title was not, leaving it partially undefined and destined
to be obliterated by "common law" concepts which were more firmly
entrenched and concretely characterized. This upshot paralleled
reports of the government's "refusal to apologize for past practices or
offer any form of repatriation to Native Peoples." ° In essence, Native
53. Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 98.
54. Id. at 98 nn.13 & 15.
55. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
56. Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 98 n.17.
57. 156 ALR 721.
58. 184 ALR 113.
59. Legg, supra note 49, at 410.
60. Id. at 387.
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Title's ambiguity was addressed by leaving little room for Native
Title, and the rights of Native Peoples, to coexist with anything else.
This legal formlessness had significant negative ramifications in
other areas such as: (a) ensuring Native Peoples' rights, (b) managing
administrative burdens for Native Peoples, (c) approaching
reconciliation, and (d) developing symbols which reflected the new
order which Mabo sought to stimulate. Each is considered in turn.
First, the Court's failure to define Native Title while
acknowledging the State's ability to extinguish Native Title set a
precedent which only served to relegate Native Peoples' rights to the
dominant culture and ultimately defy the Court's strongly worded
rhetoric. It was not long before it became clear that "[i]ndigenous title
is on the bottom rung of property law in Australia."' 1 Moreover, there
were few guideposts that would help Native Peoples "ascertain" how
to make sense of the "bundle of rights'6 2 that Mabo had given them.
Mabo had only stated that where the Crown had validly (a) "alienated
land by granting an interest that is wholly or partially inconsistent
with a continuing right to enjoy native title,"63 or (b) "effectively
appropriated land to itself and the appropriation is wholly or partially
inconsistent with a continuing right to enjoy native title," then Native
• • • 64
Title is extinguished to the "extent" of the inconsistencies. Mabo
then subsequently failed to address any issues relating to the (a)
alienation of land (freehold and leasehold); (b) grants of lesser
interests (e.g., authorities to prospect for minerals); (c) appropriation
of land by the crown; (d) pastoral leases and interests granted under
mining and petroleum legislation; (e) pastoral leases; (f) mining &
petroleum interests; (g) individual miner's rights; (h) exploration
licenses; (i) retention leases (where one does not proceed to mine
immediately but wants to hold on to the right); (j) miscellaneous
purpose licenses; (k) mining leases; (1) petroleum exploration licenses;
or (in) petroleum production licenses.65 Without reiterating these
rights, the Court left one wondering if they had any real rights at all.
Second, these frustrations were exacerbated by administrative
procedures which the government designed to help Native Peoples
61. Bill Jonas, High Court Confirms Extinguishment in Native Title Legislation,
Human Rights and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: 2002 Media
Releases, Aug. 15, 2002, at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/mediareleases/2002/48_02.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
62. T. A. Gray, The Myths of Mabo, in ESSAYS ON THE MABo DECISION 48 (1993).
63. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
64. Id.
65. See Gray, supra note 62, at 160-70.
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determine where Native Title existed. The Native Title Act of 1993
was the government's answer to Mabo and its first attempt to help
Native Peoples apply for recognition of Native Title lands which were
consistent with Mabo's principles. In light of the above observations,
however, the inevitable wrangling which resulted between Native
Peoples and other land owners resulted in exceedingly long delays,
intense frustration on all sides, 66 and scant results." Geoff Clark,
Commissioner of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission (ATSIC), felt such results should have sharpened
Australia's "determination to find another, more certain
process . . . ."6 What that process will be, or could be, is an open
question, with Clark today noting only that it "may well lead to the
negotiation of a treaty."69
Third, many of these concerns also fueled the greater difficulties
faced by Australia's Native Peoples in making a case for establishing
true reconciliation. Australia's public has been faced with the harsh
realities of its nation's past with which it feels it must come to terms.
The recent film "Rabbit Proof Fence' 70 is a case in point, dramatizing
66. See One Nation, available at http://www.onenation.com.au (illustrating
propaganda distributed by the One Nation Party dramatizing the extent of Native
Title Claims) (last visited Nov. 29, 2003); see also National Native Title Tribunal,
available at http://www.nntt.gov.au/publications/national-maps.html (Geographic
Extent of Claimant Applications as per Register of Native Title Claims map
illustrating the actual extent of Native Title Claims as of 30 September 2002) (last
visited Nov. 29, 2003) [hereinafter National Native].
67. See National Native, supra note 66 (Determinations of Native Title map
illustrating the actual Native Title grants made as of Sept. 30, 2002).
68. Taylor, supra note 8.
69. Id.
70. RABBIT PROOF FENCE (Miramax Films 2002) (dramatizing the experiences of
three Native Youngpeople who escaped from the Moore River Native Settlement to
where they had been forcibly moved after being separated from their mother in
Jigalong (in northern Australia) in 1931 over a thousand miles away; it was described
as causing a "fury" in Australia by David Fickling, The Stolen Ones, THE GUARDIAN,
Oct. 25, 2002, at 28); see also THE TRACKER (Vertigo Productions 2002) (depicting the
experiences of Native Peoples in the Australian Outback in 1922); see also BLACK AND
WHITE (New Vision Productions 2002) (dramatizing the landmark murder trial of
Max Stewart, a Native Australian from far west desert town of Ceduna, who was
sentenced to death in 1958 based on nothing more than a dubious confession for
raping a eight year old girl); see also AUSTRALIAN RULES (Palace Films 2002)
(depicting the story of a young non-Native's romance with a beautiful Native
Australian woman in a small, racially divided community in rural Australia, placing
the history of Native/Non-Native relations in a more contemporary context); see also
BENEATH CLOUDS (Axiom Films 2002) (portraying the challenges faced by a young
20031
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
the horrific effects of Australia's mixed-race child resettlement
program from 1905 through 1971. 7' This is contrasted with the fact
that "it is now generally conceded, even by the most enthusiastic
supporters of Native Title, that the $100 million expended by the
Commonwealth on Native Title ... has failed to deliver any real
improvement in the economic well being of the Aboriginal people." 2
How to dismantle a frustratingly expensive system that has not
worked while ameliorating the past has thus proved increasingly
elusive.
Finally, there is the fact that Mabo's amorphous ruling has made
it more difficult for Native Peoples to develop the symbols to reflect
the new order that Mabo ostensibly sought to stimulate. At the core
of Mabo's "revolution '7 was a reformulation of Native Title and, more
significantly, a means of acknowledging, honoring, and respecting
Native Peoples' rights. However, the revolution could never be
realized in any true form if these principles could be "extinguished."
Indeed, if property interests are on the one hand recognized as a locus
of one's cultural heritage and then on the other hand open to blatant
infringement, 4 one cannot conclude the former carries any lasting
import. There is significant irony in this observation, particularly in
non-Native woman and a Native Australian just recently released from prison and
eschewed by his family who attempt to build a relationship in rural Australia); see
also 7 STAGES OF GRIEVING (Sydney Theatre Production 2002) (addressing the issues
of race and class among Native Australian Peoples under the genre of "Australian
Indigenous Theatre"); see also TRACE OF SOMEONE (Artistic Exhibition, Steel & Glass
2002) (described as a "reminder of the outsider" in Australia today, such as Native
Peoples, immigrants, and migrants).
71. The program was grounded on the notion that the only way of solving Australia's
"coloured problem" was by breeding the "coloured blood" out of mixed-race children.
Children were therefore forcibly separated from their respective families and
resettled with non-Native families or placed in orphanages where they would learn to
assimilate into the dominant, non-Native culture.
72. Richard Egan, Aboriginal Affairs: Mabo Decision - Ten Years of Frustration,
NEWSWEEKLY, July 13, 2002, at 3, available at http://www.newsweekly.com.au/
articles/2002jull3_mabo.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
73. See MABO, supra note 4.
74. See Michael Dodson, Human Rights and the Extinguishment of Native Title, in
INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS AND THE LAw 149 (1997) (arguing the infringement of any
form of Native Title via extinguishment is tantamount to a fundamental infringement
of human rights). Dodson further argues that Australian Native Peoples should not
underestimate the benefits of attempting to engage "international complaint
procedures" more frequently (e.g., the United Nations), though Part IV of this paper
argues that a more enduring solution within Australia is ultimately needed before
any form of true reconciliation is established. Id. at 164.
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the degree to which it contradicts the positions of Justices Mason and
McHugh, who in Mabo sought to debunk the position of Lord Sumner
speaking for the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia:
The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always
inherently difficult. Some tribes are so low in the scale of social
organization that their usages and conceptions of rights and duties
are not to be reconciled with the institutions or the legal ideas of
civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to
impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law
and then to transmute it into the substance of transferable rights of
property as we know them.75
In this light, one wonders if Sumner was correct in assuming
there must be completely "separate spheres of tribal and state
autonomy,"76 giving as little weight to the laws of Australian Native
Peoples as the United States has given to Native American cultural
practices that conflict with national or state laws .v Such an approach
reflects the degree to which archeologists -previously lauded for their
work-have been increasingly seen as threats, particularly in their
ability to come to the aid of Native Peoples in their efforts to
demonstrate the timelessness and strength of their traditions.78 Such
ideas appear to preclude a fortiori any forms of joint or shared
sovereignty, though as this paper addresses in Part IV this is not a
foregone conclusion.
III. CODIFICATION OF NATIVE PEOPLES' RIGHTS & INEVITABLE
EROSIONS
The Australian Parliament addressed the fears stemming from
Mabo by passing the Native Title Act of 1993 (NTA) and following
75. In re Southern Rhodesia (1919) AC 233-34, reprinted in Mabo v. Queensland [No
2](1992) 175 CLR 1.
76. Dan Tarlock, Australian and United States Law of Aboriginal Land Rights: A
Comparative Perspective, 1 RES COMMUNES: VT'S. J. ENV'T 4, 20 (1998-99).
77. Id. at 21-22. Tarlock also points out the degree to which the United States has
rejected cultural and religious practices among Native Americans as grounding
legitimate legal claims. As evidence, he cites Lyng v. N. W. Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988), in which Sandra Day O'Connor writes that "no disrespect
for [Indian religious practices] is implied when one notes that such beliefs could
easily require de facto ownership of... spacious tracts of public property." Tarlock,
supra note 76, at 11-12 n.33.
78. See Tim Murray, Creating a Post-Mabo Archeology of Australia, in IN THE AGE OF
MABO: HISTORY, ABORIGINES AND AUSTRALIA 73, 75 (1996).
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Wik, the Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 (NTAA). Through this
legislation, Parliament was essentially clarifying what it thought the
High Court was holding while placating the needs of non-Native
individuals and businesses. These legislative developments led
largely to joint land management schemes,7 concurrent land-use
agreements,80 and alternative dispute resolution procedures which
testified to Australia's ability, as a "younger and perhaps a more
easily influenced country, '8 1 to address Mabo's implications.
Unfortunately, however, these initiatives ultimately proved either
inadequate or inappropriate, leading again to further and deeper
erosion of Native Title rights. If there were any hopes as to what
Native Title could be, these were increasingly dashed. Ultimately, the
Court symbolically threw up its hands by deciding Ward and Wilson
in August 2002. As with its other decisions addressing Native Title,
the High Court only served to further clarify and confirm the extent to
which States can extinguish Native Title. Native Title is inevitably
doomed because it rests on an ill-defined legal concept.
A. Legislation: NTA and the NTAA
The NTA embodied the Legislature's attempt to clarify how the
High Court's principles in Mabo, in particular the recognized
existence of Native Title in the absence of extinguishment, could be
managed without excessive litigation.12 Central to the legislation was
the creation of a National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT), which would
operate as a mediator and liaison to ensure litigation was only
pursued if absolutely necessary. The NTA was groundbreaking
because it was the first legislative effort in Australia seeking to fully
protect the rights of Native Peoples. 3
Writing the NTA required addressing a host of challenges and
issues. Foremost among these was deciding how to deal with mining
79. See Maureen Tehan, Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights
in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'Y J. 765 (1998).
80. Id.
81. Amy Sender, Note, Australia's Example of Treatment Towards Native Title:
Indigenous People's Land Rights in Australia and the United States, 25 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 521, 553 (1999).
82. See Bruce Petty, Terra Litigious, THE AGE, June 13, 1993, in NONIE SHARP, NO
ORDINARY JUDGMENT 18 (1996) (containing cartoon predicting an onslaught of
litigation post-Mabo).
83. See David Hodgkinson, Protection of Minority Rights in Australia: The Present
Legal Regime, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 857, 870-71 (1997).
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commitments and mineral rights, which the government had
distributed with clearly defined terms. With the granting of Native
Title, many wondered if these rights would be extinguished
automatically. Second, there were historical complications. Many
British authorities had openly recognized Native Peoples as owning
land, evidenced by dispatches to Australia by British colonial offices,
proclamations of the House of Commons, and private correspondence
between government officials. 4 The Legislature was thus faced with
the simple fact that the more broadly it defined Native Title in the
NTA, the more significant the land use conflicts would be.
Unsurprisingly, the Legislature took the middle road: (a) recognizing
Native Title in comparatively broad language 5  with "key"
constraints, (b) including provisions ensuring the impact was
817
minimized for non-Native Peoples, and (c) giving Native Peoples a
"Right to Negotiate" (RTN), 8 which meant any disputes over land
claims would need to first proceed through a clearly delineated
administrative process before advancing to any court. Native Title
thus became a "permissive right to occupy the land," which included
the rights to possess, use, and occupy the area, and the rights "to
make decisions about the area's uses, to access and control others'
access to the area, to use and enjoy the area's resources, to trade in
the area's resources, to receive royalties from the use of those
resources and to protect important cultural sites and knowledge." 9
The legislature also recognized the rights of non-Natives which had
already been granted (e.g., through leases). When there was a conflict
between titles granted by the Crown and Native Title, the Crown
prevailed. The RTN also squared firmly with the Administration's
interests of pursuing a policy of "self-determination" and "self-
management" for Native Peoples. 9 This policy focused on creating
84. See Stan Pelcyznski, The Australian High Court Recognition of Native Title-
The Mabo Judgment and Its Implications (1993), at http://www.innu.calmabo.html
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
85. See Native Title Act, 1993, § 10 (Austl.) [hereinafter NTA] (noting that "[N]ative
[T]itle is recognized, and protected, in accordance with this Act.").
86. See id. §§ 13A-23JA (summarizing the ways in which past extinguishment of
Native Title could have occurred).
87. See id. §§ 24AA-60AA.
88. See id. §§ 75-77.
89. Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 108 n.69.
90. See Exhibit 3, noted in the Appendix (summarizing the approaches towards
Native Peoples taken by various Australian administrations from 1972 to the
present).
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Aboriginal enterprises, restoring Native Peoples' connection to the
land, and providing compensation for lands taken after the RDA (as
long as non-Natives were compensated for land that was taken from
them as well).91
Despite "intense" and "hostile political and community
comment,"92 the RDA passed and commenced operation. By January,
1994, the NNTT was established and Native Title Representative
Bodies (NTRBs) fanned across Australia to begin working as quasi-
"mediation service[s]" to help individuals resolve their claims. The
roles of the ATSIC Commissioner were broadened 4 to include
authority over implementing provisions of both the NTA and a range
of international agreements.95
The NTA was tested just two years after its passage in Western
Australia v. Commonwealth,96 which considered whether the NTA
trumped the Western Australia Land (Titles and Traditional Usage)
Act of 1993 (WA). The latter Act purported to extinguish all Native
Title in Western Australia and replace it with a regime of statutorily
managed "rights of traditional usage." In its decision, the High Court
found (a) the NTA was a valid exercise of Parliamentary power under
91. See Meyers & Raine, supra note 44.
92. Id. at 96.
93. Id. at 100.
94. See NTA, supra note 85, § 209.
95. These agreements include: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Convention on Elimination of
Discrimination, supra note 22; Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
html/menu3/b/62.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003); Draft Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, available at http://www.usask.ca/nativelaw/ddir.html (last
visited Oct. 29, 2003); Convention on Biological Diversity, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/ convention/articles.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (recognizing
contributions indigenous peoples can make to the "conservation and management of
biological diversity"; Gillian Triggs, Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International
Law: Validity of the Native Title Amendment Act, 1998, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 372, 391
(1999)); and Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific, June 12,
1976, available at http://sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/ nature.south.pacific. 1976.html
(detailing provisions for the customary use of areas and species in National Parks and
National Reserves in accordance with traditional customary practices; Triggs, supra
at 392).
96. Western Australia v. Commonwealth, (1995) 183 CLR 373.
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the Constitution,97 (b) Native Title in Western Australia was not
extinguished upon settlement, and (c) the Western Australia Act was
invalid in the degree to which it was inconsistent with the RDA
because it made rights of "traditional usage" subject to
extinguishment and implicitly fell under the aegis of a separate and
unequal doctrine. In this way, the Court held the RDA was the key
standard by which Native Title state legislation would be judged. In
addition, the RDA continued to form the basis of the High Court's
evolving doctrine regarding Native Title claims, which are most
clearly asserted in Mabo.
After Wik, increasing sentiments that the NTA had caused the
"pendulum" to swing "too far in the indigenous direction"9" compelled
the Liberal government under the leadership of John Howard to
propose a ten-point plan to address the NTA's problems.9 9 The plan
purported to encourage that Native Peoples be treated with an eye to
"self-empowerment"100 instead of state assistance. The amendments
were largely driven by arguments that (a) terra nullius was purely an
argument of unfounded guilt and an attempt to assuage it; (b) there
97. See Australian Constitution s 51. It states that "Parliament shall, subject to this
Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
the Commonwealth with respect to: ... (xxvi). The people of any race, for whom it is
deemed necessary to make special laws. . . ." Id. Because this clause addresses
issues of race (which by implication includes Native Peoples) it has often been termed
the "race clause" or the "race power." Notably, the clause formerly included the words
"other than the aboriginal race," though these words were deleted after a
Constitutionally-mandated referendum was passed (89.34% in favor) on May 27,
1967, leading to the Constitution Alteration (Aboriginals) Act of 1967 (ensuring that
Native Peoples were counted in calculating the population of the Commonwealth and
every SAT, as well). The Constitution (§ 128) requires that any constitutional
amendments be passed by a national referendum with an (a) overall national
majority and (b) a majority in four of Australia's six states; voting is also compulsory
under the Commonwealth Electoral Act of 1918, § 101(1) (requiring all individuals
"entitled" to vote to "register" to vote and actually "vote"); see also BBC World Service,
Voting Compulsory for All Australians, BBC NEWSWIRE, Oct. 26, 2001 (noting how
Australian referendum results have a high correlation with actual public sentiment).
98. Interview by Natasha Johnson with Bonita Mabo, Widow of Eddie Mabo (Mar. 6,
2002), available at http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/s572090.htm (last visited Oct. 29,
2003).
99. See Garth Nettheim, The Search for Certainty and the Native Title Amendment
Act, 1998, 22(2) U.N.S.W. L. J. 564 (1999); see also Richard Bartlett, A Return to
Dispossession and Discrimination: The Ten Point Plan, 27(1) U. W. AUST. L. REV. 44
(1997); see also R. S. French, A Hitchhiker's Guide to the Native Title Act, 25(2)
MONASH U. L. REV. 375 (1999); see also Legg, supra note 49, 406 n.99.
100. See Exhibit 3, supra note 90.
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were inconsistencies in international law which Australia failed to
recognize (e.g., the Turks held Asia-Minor and the city of Istanbul;
China held Tibet; and the US has Guam and Hawaii);' (c) if
declaration of Britain's sovereignty was not sufficient to extinguish
pre-existing Native Title, then it did not make sense that the granting
of freehold would do so;10° (d) the High Court did not have any
jurisdiction over Native Lands by the implications of its own
admissions in Mabo; and (e) the Mer Islands considered in Mabo
differed markedly from mainland Australia invalidating the Court's
decision in Mabo over any lands not in the Torres Strait.' 3 More
important, and far more serious as far as non-Native government
leaders were concerned, were businesspeoples' concerns that while
RTN ensured "indigenous participation as well as consensual and
procedural agreement, 0 4 it also led to greater uncertainty since it
was not clear what would result. This translated into macroeconomic
fears of lowered economic growth which hampered Australia's global
competitiveness.
101. See Rob Perez, Kingdom Supporters Take Case to World Body, HONOLULU STAR
BULLETIN, Jan. 3, 2000, available at http://starbulletin.con2000/01/03/news/
story3.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (publicizing the case of Lance Paul Larsen v.
the Hawaiian Kingdom brought before the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the
Hague, the Netherlands, and arguing that Hawaii is not a legal state of the U.S.
under international law); see also David Keanu Sai, Van Dyke in Gross Error,
available at http://www.alohaquest.com/ arbitration/newsvandykeinerror.htm (last
visited Oct. 29, 2003) (arguing that Hawaii is illegally a part of the U.S. because the
relations between the U.S. and the Hawaiian Kingdom fail to fall into any of the five
ways which international law has recognized states' acquiring territory: (a)
occupation by discovery; (b) accretion (e.g., expansion by natural means, such as
landfills and lava); (c) cession (i.e., "voluntary" transfer of landed territory such as in
the Louisiana or Alaska Purchases); (d) conquest (i.e., by treaty or surrender); and (e)
prescription (i.e., through the passage of time and a given country's silence)).
102. This is because the legality of freehold depended on the legality of the sovereign
to grant freehold.
103. Among the differences highlighted in press reports were the fact that (a) Mabo
and Torres Strait Islanders were Melanesian and not Aboriginal, thus implying that
the Court's agreement should have been limited in scope, (b) the island of Mer was
annexed by Queensland in 1879 and set aside in 1882 for exclusive use of natives,
making their need for Native Title moot; and (c) natives were on the islands around
Mer continuously except for a small parcel leased by the Crown to the London
Missionary Society and a sardine factory.
104. Gretchen Freeman Cappio, Erosion of the Indigenous Right to Negotiate in
Australia: Proposed Amendments to the Native Title Act, 7 PAc. RIM L. & POLY J. 405
(1998) (arguing that the NTAA amendments-which were ultimately passed-ran
the risk of significantly and deleteriously eroding the rights of Indigenous People in
Australia).
[Vol. 11.1
MABO'S WAKE
The NTAA's effects'0 ' illustrate the extent to which the NTAA
altered the NTA and hurt Native Peoples' interests. Among the most
egregious changes as far as Australian Native Peoples were concerned
related to the practical extinguishment of RTN. Changes to the
NTAA allowing states to implement alternatives to RTN as long as
the legislation met minimal standards, which were arguably
insufficient to fully "protect Indigenous interests in land."'06 Giving
states the authority to eliminate the RTA was equivalent to allowing
states the ability to eliminate any say of Native Peoples regarding
their traditional lands, which were ostensibly subject to Native Title.
Granted, these prohibitions were not guaranteed and theoretically
moderated by alternative consultation schemes reiterated in the
NTAA. However, soon after the NTAA's passage, Queensland passed
measures updating the way it managed the Native Title
determination process." 7  This led Dr. Bill Jonas, the ATSIC
Commissioner, to decry the changes and highlight how they would
"erode native title rights for indigenous people in Queensland."'18
Second, what was most onerous and troubling was the fact that the
amended NTA also exempted State legislation regarding Native Title
from key provisions of the RDA, which had formed the basis of Mabo
and grounded Native People's hopes in securing Native Title. Native
Title, in whatever form one might have deemed it to exist, thus
seemed to have little footing following the NTAA, except the High
Court's naive and blindly optimistic vision explicated in Mabo, which
remained evermore elusive.
105. Exhibit 4, noted in the Appendix (assessing the way in which the NTAA
increased or decreased the power of key constituencies); Exhibits 5-10, noted in the
Appendix (summarizing the key areas affected by the NTAA and assesses the effects
of these changes on Australia's Native Peoples). In summary, as illustrated in
Exhibit 10, the NTAA significantly curtailed and limited the rights of Native Peoples;
see also Paul Burke & the ATSIC Wik Team, Analysis of the Native Title Amendment
Act of 1998, Aug. 1998, available at http://www.atsic.gov.au/issues/Land/
NativeTitle/detailedanalysis-of thenative.asp (informing key points in the
exhibits heretofore noted) (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
106. Jonas, supra note 61.
107. See NTA, supra note 85.
108. Bill Jonas, The Queensland Native Title Regime, AUSTRALIAN HUMAN RIGHTS AND
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION: 2000 MEDIA RELEASES, June 4, 2000,
available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/media-releases/20O0/00-1l.html (last visited
Oct. 29, 2003).
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B. Recent Cases: Ward (Miriuwung Gajerrong) and Wilson
If one had reason to suspect the High Court would clarify its
vision in Mabo after the NTAA, these hopes were dashed in August
2002, with the decisions of Ward (also known as Miriuwung
Gajerrong after Native Peoples who were parties to the case)'0 9 and
Wilson. "1 Stemming directly from the fact that Mabo's precepts,
particularly with regards to "natural resources industries," were
"vague and manipulable,""' and that Pastoral Leases had increasingly
become a "subject of speculation"112 because it was unclear to what
extent they were insulated from Native Title claims, the Court
attempted to clarify what land interests took precedence over others
and when Native Title "kicked in."' Unfortunately, the Court
apparently still did not come to grips with the fact that the concept of
Native Title was still elusive.
Within days of releasing its opinion in Ward (a 312-page tome
sporting 1064 footnotes and 973 paragraphs), Dr. Jonas commented
the Court had only ensured Native Title was destined to be governed
by "legislation rather than the principles established in Mabo or
Wik."" The upshots of Ward and Wilson seemed only to be that
[a] some interests in land completely extinguish native title, that
[b] there can be partial extinguishment of native title and that [c]
native title rights to minerals and petroleum may be extinguished
by... resource legislation .... [and] [d] the grant of a pastoral
lease . . . extinguishes the (native title) right to control access
and ... pastoral leaseholder, . . . rights prevail over the native title
rights.11'
Because this was independent of the fact that ownership of most
minerals and ores typically vested in landowners at common law,"
6
the Court suggested if there was any question that Native Title was
independent of the common law, it was now confirmed. Because the
109. See Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1.
110. See Wilson v. Anderson (2002) 190 ALR 313.
111. J.R.S. Forbes, Mabo and the Miners-ad ininitum?, in MABO: THE NATIVE TITLE
LEGISLATION 49 (M.A. Stephenson ed., 1995) [hereinafter MABO LEGISLATION].
112. M. A. Stephenson, Pastoral Leases and Reservation Clauses, in MABO
LEGISLATION, supra note 111, at 104.
113. See Exhibit 2, noted in the Appendix (summarizing the array of events which led
up to the High Court's decisions in Ward and Wilson).
114. Jonas, supra note 61.
115. Id.
116. HEATHER MCRAE ET AL., ABORIGINAL LEGAL ISSUES 187 (1991).
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Court's main holding in Mabo was that Native Title held under
common law, one was left wondering what the court was really
saying.
Identifying the locus of the confusion requires one first
understand more precisely what the holdings in Ward and Wilson
were. Only following such an analysis can one see more clearly why
Ward required 312 pages and, quite likely, future decisions will be
even more voluminous given Native Title's judicial trajectory.
At issue in Ward was whether Mining and Pastoral Leases issued
by the State extinguished Native Title and secondly, what rights and
interests, if any, accrued to states and Native Peoples in their quest to
secure their rights. Within the boundaries of the lands addressed in
Ward was the notable Argyle Diamond Mine," 7 the world's single
largest producer of diamonds currently valued at A$2,075,800,000.
Therefore, from Ward's inception it was clear that whoever "won"
stood to gain extraordinary and arguably unparalleled economic
rewards. Similarly, at issue in Wilson was whether land subject to a
perpetual grazing lease conferred exclusive possession to the lessee;
unlike in Ward, however, there was no diamond mine at stake.
The Court's holdings in Ward and Wilson can be divided into two
categories: the first addressing issues of extinguishment, and the
second addressing the rights and interests of key constituencies.
Both, as noted above, illustrate how the concept of Native Title as it
now exists in Australia carries little import since what remains can
easily be extinguished entirely. An alternative system is thus needed
to secure Native Peoples' rights in the hopes of achieving any
reconciliation.
First, with regards to extinguishment, the Court found that
Pastoral and Mining Leases extinguish some Native Title rights,
particularly vis-A-vis the rights to control access to land. On the other
hand, Pastoral and Mining Leases do not give one exclusive
possession of land, so they cannot be said to extinguish Native Title
fully. Native Title for these purposes is thus best seen as containing a
"bundle" of different kinds of rights,"" which are only partially
117. See Website for the Mining Industry, Argyle Diamond Mine, Australia, available
at http:f/www/mining-technology.com/projectslargyle/ (containing photographs of the
mine and its operations in West Australia) (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
118. See generally Western Australia v. Ward (2002) 191 ALR 1; see also Cynthia
Banham & Daniel Lewis, Aborigines Lose Claim to Mine Land, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, Aug. 9, 2002, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/08/
1028157991715.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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extinguished to the extent that the rights contained in the lease are
not inconsistent with Native Title rights.
With particular regards to minerals and ores (under which
diamonds are conclusively subsumed), the court held that different
leases covered different substances, with Western Australia statutes
granting all in situ mineral rights exclusively to the Crown and New
South Wales statutes only covering coal. Native Title Rights
generally exist to the surface of any ores and only cover ores (and
explicitly not minerals, as discussed infra) underneath the surface if
it can be clearly illustrated that some "tradition" exists involving the
use of the ores. However, this tradition cannot be assessed simply
and can be potentially subjected to an array of complex
assessments. 9 Finally, the Court held that all leases extinguish the
exclusive right to fish in tidal waters and all "perpetual" leases120
serve to extinguish Native Title. 12' The latter holding was highlighted
by Mal Peters, the President of the New South Wales Farming
Association, as giving "land-holders greater security so they can
borrow and invest for the future."122
Second, with regards to certain rights and interests, the Court
held first that there can never be a Native Title right to, or interest
in, any mineral or petroleum. If any rights to minerals or petroleum
ever existed in Western Australia, they would have been completely
extinguished by legislation in the Western Australia Land Act of
1898. This conclusively ensured that the Argyle Mine, and any future
119. See generally Ward, 191 ALR at 1. However, Australia ultimately can be deemed
to give Native Peoples far more respect than the United States, in which cultural and
religious practices can be interpreted as derided by Sandra Day O'Connor in Lyng v.
N.W. Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988), stating that "no disrespect
for [Indian religious practices] is implied when one noted that such beliefs could
easily require de facto ownership of... spacious tracts of public property" and
"whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area,... those rights do not
divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land"; see also Tarlock,
supra note 76, at 12 n.33. However, the arguments by Jennifer Clark, commenting
on Ward, that "spirituality alone may connect people to land even when they can't
prove recent presence on it, but spirituality alone is unlikely to generate recognizable
rights." Jennifer Clarke, Recent Native Title Decisions in the High Court, ANU
Faculty of Law Reflection Paper, Aug. 12, 2002, at http://www.onlineopinion.com.au/
2002/SepO2/ClarkeJ.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2003) (emphasis added).
120. See Western Lands Act, 1901 (Austl.)
121. See Clarke, supra note 119 (commenting that Perpetual Leases are essentially
the "evolutionary successors of a type of freehold title granted by early New South
Wales governors, for which the holders paid 'rent' and kept convicts").
122. Banham & Lewis, supra note 118.
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oil wells, were in safe and secure hands (i.e., not the Native Peoples').
In contrast, Native Title rights and interests which exist, and are
reiterated and protected in the NTA (as amended by the NTAA), are
those in relation to land or waters where the Native Peoples have a
connection 2 3 through traditional laws and customs. Claims for
protection of cultural knowledge, which go beyond denial or control of
access to land or waters, are not protected.
Justice McHugh, recognizing the import of all the Court's
holdings, openly recognized the position in which these holdings
placed Australia's Native Peoples by writing:
The dispossession of the Aboriginal peoples from their lands was a
great wrong. Many people believe that those of us who are the
beneficiaries of that wrong have a moral responsibility to redress it
to the extent that it can be redressed. But it is becoming
increasingly clear.., that redress cannot be achieved by a system
that depends on evaluating the competing legal rights of
landholders and native-title holders. The deck is stacked against
the native-title holders whose fragile rights must give way to the
superior rights of the landholders whenever the two classes of
rights conflict.
1 4
In essence, the Court's ruling ensured that no land would be
available for Native Title from which Native Peoples could either (a)
profit from natural resources or (b) subsume control of in any
populated state (e.g., New South Wales and Victoria).2  The fact that
Ward and Wilson were not "decisions" in the extent to which they
remanded the cases to lower courts to come to findings consistent
with the opinions left little cause for optimism. The Court's tone was
stark and bleak, with little room to maneuver.
The main problem with Ward and Wilson, notwithstanding the
former's blatant obsequiousness with diamond dealers, is that they
123. See Ward, 191 ALR at 193-94 (discussing how "connection" with the land
requires "at least physical presence").
124. Id. at 163.
125. Darren Fooks, Native Title Activist, quoted by Jim Dickins, Native Title Failure,
HERALD SUN-MELBOURNE, Aug. 9, 2002, at 17, available at
http://www.infarmation.com.au/news/02/08/article7696.asp (last visited Oct. 29,
2003). However, the fact that Ward has not stopped Native Title from being granted.
In fact, on September 27, 2002, less than two months after Ward and Wilson, the
Martu people had 136,000 km' area of Western Desert recognized-though the key
word highlighted by critics was "desert." National Native Title Tribunal, WA's Martu
People Achieve Native Title Recognition in Western Desert, Sept. 27, 2002, available at
http://www.nntt.gov.au/media/1033720087_2600.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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struggle to come to terms with Native Title by embracing a concept of
a "bundle of rights" which is inherently amorphous. The Court is
forced to define interests in such a way that Native Peoples' true
interests are left up to the whims of individual judges and interest
groups. Indeed, the "bundle" idea, not surprisingly, originated in
Mabo 126 with Justice Toohey.' 27 Ward embraced this idea, as it gave
the Court a means of more finely defining Native Title rights and
interests via discrete pieces while appearing to extend and strengthen
Mabo's holding. Chief Justice Gleeson, and Justices Gaudon,
Gummow, and Hayne write tellingly in Ward:
Reference was made in Mabo to the inherent fragility of native
title.., found in [the] core concept of a right to be asked [for]
permission [to enter onto land] and to speak for [a] country. The
assertion of sovereignty [by Britain] marked the imposition of a
new source of authority over the land. Upon that authority being
exercised.., the right to be asked for permission to use or have
access to the land was inevitably confined, if not excluded. But
because native title is more than the right to be asked for
permission to use or have access (important though that right
undoubtedly is) there are other rights and interests which must be
considered, including rights and interests in the use of the land.1
28
Therefore, in Ward the Court attempted a quasi-slight of hand in
holding that (a) Mabo's holding was limited, (b) Ward sought to
extend the holding, and (c) by reiterating the times when Native Title
126. The idea "originated" in Mabo in the sense that Mabo is the precedent on which
the Court bases its opinion in Ward. However, the concept of "bundles" of rights and
duties vis-a-vis land rights in Australia has its origins in sources such as WESLEY
HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTOINS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND
OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (1923), and Antony Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE: A COLLABORATIVE WORK 107 (Anthony Guest ed., 1961), construed in
Katy Bartnett, One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: Native Title and the Bundle of
Rights Analysis, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 462, 469 n.87 (2000).
127. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 1 (emphasis added). Toohey J.
wrote:
"Possession" is notoriously difficult to define.., but for present
purposes it may be said to be a conclusion of law defining the nature
and status of a particular relationship of control by a person over
land. "Title" is, in the present case, the abstract bundle of rights
associated with that relationship of possession. Significantly, it is
also used to describe the group of rights which result from possession
but which survive its loss; this includes the right to possession.
Id.
128. Ward, 191 ALR at 44-45 (emphasis added).
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was extinguished, elucidating all the "rights and interests in the use
of the land" which were part of Native Title. Despite such
metaphorical smoke and mirrors, Katy Bartnett, paraphrasing
Beumont and von Doussa, notes how Ward ultimately recognizes that
"Native Title is a right different from and lesser than any common law
right," and, more importantly, "a fragile divisible interest which can be
extinguished piece by piece. " 12  Since the "bundle" does not include
any spiritual rights or any rights that can be seen to be anything less
than absolute, it is impossible to gain a realistic perspective of Native
Peoples' interests or equate Native Peoples' interests with any
"fundamental connection to the land itself."130
The deficiencies of the "bundle" idea transcend the fact that it is
simply too complex and fails to reflect the significance with which
Native Peoples would like to be able to view Native Title. As Bartnett
partially explicates, the "bundle" idea (a) fails as a "unified legal
relation" (i.e., one does not fully know what it contains, though one
can say one has it), 13 1 (b) is a dangerously "disintegrated" approach to
understanding something, which is best understood as a "whole"13 for
Native Peoples, (c) is simply too malleable a concept for something so
truly important to Native Peoples' identities, 3  and (d) bluntly
illustrates an "illusion" of property which fails to accord with the
stark reality of Native Peoples' understandings of the land.14 Faced
129. Bartnett, supra note 126, at 463 (emphasis added).
130. See Id. at 467 n.58 (citing Justice North's justified frustration in Ward that
extinguishing Native Title requires an "absolute inconsistency" between the "rights
created and native title which is absolute, total, complete or fundamental," thus
forcing one to ignore key requisites of Native Peoples' experiences of reality and their
true relationship to the land over which they seek to claim Native Title in the first
place).
131. See James Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV.
711, 712 (1996), construed in Bartnett, supra note 126, at 471 n.104.
132. See Thomas Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY 69, 74 (J. Roland
Pennock & John Chapman eds., 1980), construed in Bartnett, supra note 126, at 472
n.117 (noting how the disintegrated view originated largely in the wake of Marxism
and capitalist notions of the Division of Labor and property as entities which stem
from one's labor and other aspects of one's work. Undoubtedly, these views contrast
sharply with Native Peoples' views of the land as containing value independent of the
labor they have "put into" it).
133. See Barry Hoffmaster, Between the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property,
and Patents in the Moore Case, 7 INTELL. PROP. J. 115, 128 (1992), construed in
Barnett, supra note 126, at 472 n.120:
134. See Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991), construed
in Barnett, supra note 126, at 473 n.124; see also Jacque Derrida, Some Statements
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with this array of challenges illustrating the inappropriateness of
envisaging property as a "bundle" of rights, and desiring to reflect the
fact Native Title can have very real consequences on Native Peoples'
lives, one is left with attempting to find ways to transcend Ward's and
Wilson's limited cultural perspectives by overcoming their "piece-by-
piece" extinguishments of Native Title. As discussed infra, the
Canadian Supreme Court in Delgamuukw" 5 expressly rejected the
"bundle of rights" approach in favor of a "fundamental connection"
assessment of Native Peoples and their land. This helped ensure
there could be "no partial extinguishment of Native Title where the
underlying connection with the land survives."36
C. Ensuing Problems
The NTA (as amended by the NTAA), Ward, and Wilson all leave
Native Peoples with little hope, and for good reason. The changes
made by the NTAA to the NTA, described as a "worst case scenario for
Australia's Indigenous People" by Rev. Peter Maher at the Pax Christi
International Meeting in London before their adoption, ultimately
made "no reference to the needs" of Native Peoples by denying them
RTN. Thus, the changes made to the NTA threatened "the process of
reconciliation" itself."3 7 The principles of the NTAA, buttressed by the
High Court's decisions in Ward and Wilson, ultimately "upgrades
pastoral leases in a way never intended in the 150 year history of
pastoral leaseholdings, it does this at the expense of Indigenous
rights and at taxpayers' expense and it threatens to bring about
environmental havoc because controls are limited on freehold land.' 38
Commercial interests and lobby groups, as with Ward and Wilson,
furthermore drove the NTAA, all but ignoring the "pluralism inherent
in different indigenous claims to land."39 After the initial passage of
the NTA, Michael Dodson, the first ATSIC Commissioner, noted that
"the true test" of the NTA's success was to be measured in the "degree
to which it protects the human rights of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
and Truisms about Neologisms, Newisms, Postisms, Parasitisms, and other small
Seismisms, in THE STATES OF THEORY 63 (1989).
135. See generally Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
136. Bartnett, supra note 126, at 465.
137. Rev. Peter Maher, Address at the Pax Christi International Meeting (July 18,
1997), available at http://www.paxchristi.netPDF/RM08E97.pdf (last visited Oct. 27,
2003).
138. Id.
139. Id.
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Islander people."40 While freehold grants have been convenient in the
degree to which they have completely extinguished Native Title
claims, however, the desire to use them and increasingly create them
is disheartening. The High Court's assessments of leasehold lands, as
illustrated in Ward and Wilson, have resulted from the irrational
constraints of the Numerus Clausus principle14 1 instead of more
justified, enduring rationales. There is no implicit reason why Native
Title should coexist or be extinguished either more or less fluidly by
certain types of leases. Rather, the Court seems only to want to force
a uniquely shaped peg into pre-existing holes, ignoring something
more fundamental and enduring about what Native Title means and,
more significantly, what it signifies: a dream of Native Sovereignty in
its purest form.14
2
IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES & ACHIEVING TRUE RECONCILIATION
Parts II and III illustrated the degree to which Mabo's concept of
Native Title has failed to live up to its promise, largely stemming
from the fact that it was ill-defined and consequently failed to
accommodate Native Peoples' needs. Further problems with the way
Native Title has been subsequently formulated, such as: (a) including
a "bundle" of rights, (b) lacking a durable set of rationales governing
when title is extinguished by leaseholds, and (c) appearing to be
inconsistently determined (e.g., mare nullius' endurance despite terra
nullius' extinction), leaves one wondering how to best protect what
remains .1' The current risk of State legislation converting huge
amounts of land to freehold is real because it would forever extinguish
the rights of Native Peoples to enjoy the benefits of Native Title. The
140. MICHAEL DODSON, NATIVE TITLE REPORT: JANUARY-JUNE 1994 (1995), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/special/rsjprojectlrsjlibrary/hreoc/ntreport-1994/ (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003).
141. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: the Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000) (discussing the
limitations of the Numerus Clausus principle).
142. See Henry Reynolds, After Mabo, What About Aboriginal Sovereignty?,
Australian Human. Rev., Apr. 1996, at http://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/AHR/
archive/Issue-April-1996/Reynolds.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003), discussed in
greater detail infra.
143. See WILLIAM JONAS, NATIVE TITLE REPORT: 2000 4 (2001); see also William Jonas,
2000 Native Title Report Summary, Human Rights & Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Article Series, available at http://www.hreoc.gov.au/
socialjustice/nativetitle/nt2000jreport.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) [hereinafter
2000 Summary].
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need to invalidate the distinctions between freehold and leasehold
lands vis-&-vis Native Title must occur if the deep "spiritual
relationship between Indigenous People and their land"144 can be fully
recognized.
To date, legislative acts and judicial rulings have been unable to
make the necessary accommodations that Native Title requires for
Native Peoples. The NTA has failed to protect Native Peoples'
heritage, viewing it as a relic instead of a living, breathing artifact
with its locus in the land. The Courts, similarly, seem unable to
recognize the spiritual connections existing between Native People
and the land (or the sea).145 This was illustrated most recently in the
Croker Island Case, in which the court held that Native Title could
exist in relation to a seabed but that this conferred no exclusivity on
Native claimants. 46 In this way, the judicial branch appeared unable
to expand beyond its self-imposed confines of Anglo-American
traditions, which lack the flexibility Native Peoples and Native Title
demand and deserve. Ultimately, when pushed, the uncertain
147property interests of non-Native Peoples always trumps, as
illustrated in The Land (Titles and Traditional Usage) Bill of 1993
(WA) which attempted to homogenize Native Title claims by focusing
only on the use to which lands are put. It failed to see how Native
Peoples' interests and values were not analogous to freehold rights;1
48
viewing them as a "license" would have made more sense, though this
option was never considered.
These challenges require the law to turn to other extrinsic
principles; only then can it evolve. Christopher Shanahan argues that
the theoretical problem is largely one of a "dialectic tension" between
(a) "internal pluralism," evinced by legislative acts designed to clarify
the relationships among members of a well defined polity, and (b)
"external pluralism," implied by a Native Title right which transcends
the polity, but must coexist with it. 149 The ultimate question of which
takes precedence renders the entire system lifeless, since any
legislation must deny Native Peoples of their rights due to the fact
144. 2000 Summary, supra note 143.
145. See id.
146. Commonwealth of Australia v. Yarmirr (2001) 184 ALR 113.
147. DODSON, supra note 140, at 11.
148. See generally Christopher Shanahan, Legislative Responses to Mabo: Rendering
the Law Unconscious, 2 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J. OF L. 1, 12 (1995), available at
http://wwwmurdoch.edu.aulelaw/issues/v2nl/shanahan2l.html (last visited Oct. 27,
2003).
149. Id.
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that the legislation cannot theoretically meet the needs of external
constituencies.
On a less theoretical level, principles clearly do exist, and have
been widely disseminated, by international bodies such as the United
Nations. For instance, the UN Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD) openly criticized the NTAA's
elimination of the RTNW5° because the state did not obtain the
informed consent of Native Peoples before altering the management of
any of their potential lands.15 ' The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination requires such consent 5
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights carries
similarly significant obligations.153  Furthermore, there are other
major domestic challenges that need to be wrestled with, such as re-
conceiving "equality" by understanding fully that "equality does not
mean treating Indigenous People the same as non-Indigenous people.
Native title is a unique interest in land that can only be enjoyed by
150. See Report of Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General
Recommendation XXIII Indigenous Peoples, 51st Sess., U.N. Doe. A/52/18, Annex V
(1997), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/genrexxiii.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003).
151. See Triggs, supra note 95.
152. Convention on Elimination of Discrimination, supra note 22, Article 5
(addressing the land rights of Native Peoples) of the Convention carries significant
import here, reading as follows:
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to
equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of...
(c) Political rights, in particular.., to take part in the Government
as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have
equal access to public service.
Id.
153. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). Articles 1 and 27
(summarizing key obligations of signatory states) carry significant import here:
Art. 1 (3). The States Parties to the present Covenant... shall
promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall
respect that right ....
Art. 27. In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be
denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own
religion, or to use their own language.
Id. art. 1, 27.
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Indigenous People. Equality requires that this unique interest be
given equal protection to that extended to non-Indigenous interests in
land.'5 4
Ultimately, one thing is certain: the construction of Native Title
at common law will determine whether Native Title can withstand
non-Native interests. As stark as it sounds, either Native Title will
come to be realized in its fullest capacity or Native Peoples and their
cultures will cease to be.
A. Native Peoples' Understandings of the Land
The first step in "enabling" the common law to "understand" and
"embrace" Native interests in Native Title is defining what these
interests are. For non-Natives, who may have had few experiences
with Native traditions, customs, and practices, defining these
interests may be difficult. For these purposes, it is worthwhile
considering the ways in which Australian Native Peoples' perceptions,
approaches, and relationships with the land can be generalized.
While the comments below do not purport to represent a
comprehensive account of such principles, they provide a base from
which one can begin to derive legal principles to bridge the gaps
between Native and non-Native Peoples which have fuelled the
disintegration of Native Title since Mabo and are preventing it from
achieving its potential.
W.E.H. Stanner, an anthropologist who sought to explain to non-
Native Australians how Australian Native Peoples viewed the land,
wrote:
There are no English words good enough to give a sense of the links
between an Aboriginal group and its homeland. Our word 'home',
warm and suggesting though it be, does not match the Aboriginal
word that may mean 'camp', 'hearth', 'country', 'everlasting home',
'totem place', 'life source', 'spirit centre', and much else all in one.
Our word 'land' is too sparse and meagre. We can scarcely use it
except with economic overtures unless we happen to be poets .... I
have seen an Aboriginal embrace the earth he walked on .... [The
Western] tradition leaves us tongueless and earless towards this
other world of meaning and significance. 55
154. 2000 Summary, supra note 143.
155. W.E.H. Stanner, Aboriginal Territorial Organization: Estate, Range, Domain,
and Regime, 36 OCEANA 1 (1965), quoted by P. NATHAN & D. L. JAPANANGKA, SETTLE
DOWN COUNTRY 11 (1983) [hereinafter SETTLE DOWN COUNTRY], construed in
[Vol. 11. 1
MABO'S WAKE
Stanner's words are directly echoed by those of Christopher
Cunneen and Terry Libesman, who comment that the "meaning of the
land" for Australian Native Peoples is "sophisticated" and that
"traditional understandings ... are too subtle and complex" for an
outsider to claim to understand or, at the very least, describe. 116 P.
Nathan and D. L. Japanangka are less pessimistic, noting that land
among Native Peoples "constitutes the essence of life," which is
something, at least in its import, everyone can understand.
1 7
Two challenges faced by non-Native peoples attempting to
understand Australian Native Peoples' approaches to land revolve
around ownership and authority. These concepts are divorced from
one another in Native Peoples' understanding of their relationship
with the earth. In the Anglo-American tradition, ownership of land in
fee simple is basically synonymous with occupation and control: that
is, if one sets oneself on a piece of land and remains present on the
land, then one owns it and can do with it what one pleases within
certain guidelines. In this way, both ownership and authority are
indelibly linked and mutually reinforcing. Without ownership, one
cannot have authority; and without any authority, one cannot have
ownership. By contrast, for Native Peoples the two may be related
though not necessarily linked. The ways Native Peoples see
"ownership" and "authority" differ markedly from their non-Native
counterparts.
The concept of "ownership" for Native Peoples is probably best
described as a "very deep connection," though these words fail to
capture the essence of Native Peoples deep spiritual and emotive
connection to the land. This deep connection is evident in Native
Peoples' cultural heritage, which is expressed in depictions of "events
from an ancestral past," known as Dreamtime, "preserved in tribal
lore and periodically recreated... [including] each community's oral
history, the details of certain rituals and ceremonies, the music and
dance sequences used at gatherings, and even knowledge of the
natural environment inhabited by the community."' 8 The spirits who
inhabited Dreamtime are those from whom all Native Peoples
descend and with whom all Native Peoples are related. And in
CHRISTOPHER CUNNEEN & TERRY LIBESMAN, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE LAW IN
AUSTRALIA 102-03 (1995) [hereinafter IPLA].
156. IPLA, supra note 155, at 102.
157. Id. at 102-03.
158. Jill McKeough & Andrew Stewart, Intellectual Property and the Dreaming, in
INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS AND THE LAW 53 (1997).
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determining the spirits with whom Native Peoples are linked, Native
Peoples turn to their respective families and larger communities from
whom they learn songs, which trace this lineage. It is these songs,
through which Native Peoples are able to discover their lineage in
Dreamtime, which are inherently linked to the land. Moreover, it is
these songs, which are mapped through physical space by
"Songlines,"15 9 tracing and racing through the land, which enable
Native Peoples to understand fully their identities and origins.
For all intents and purposes non-Native Peoples can probably
best view Songlines as the marks of Native Peoples' property and
"ownership." Indeed, just as non-Native Peoples employ surveyors to
confirm boundaries and cartographers to draw maps, Native Peoples
sing and share songs that depict and express the routes of Dreamings
during Dreamtime and confirm the locations of their respective
identities. Unlike non-Native Peoples' property rights, which are
largely frozen in time, Songlines can shift depending on changes in
the landscape. Furthermore, unlike non-Native Peoples' seemingly
incessant focus on associating individuals with specifically mapped
areas, Native Peoples jointly share and embrace Songlines and
Dreamings communally. Just as blood-relatives are connected
through distant familial ties, Native Peoples are connected through
intersecting Songlines that mirror their familial ties.16° In a given
"piece" of land, there can also exist an innumerable number of
Songlines associated with just as many Dreamings extending over
vast distances.1"1 Therefore, the whole Australian continent can be
159. See Richard Moyle, Songs, Ceremonies, and Sites: The Agharringa Case, in
ABORIGINES, LAND AND LAND RIGHTS 66 (1983) [hereinafter ABORIGINE LAND RIGHTS]
(detailing the types and natures of Songlines); see also BRUCE CHATWIN, THE
SONGLINES (1987) [hereinafter THE SONGLINES] (describing his factual quest to
understand the significant, meaning, and import of Songlines in Native Peoples'
communities); see also MUDROOROO NYOONGAH, US MOB: HISTORY, CULTURE,
STRUGGLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIA 175-92 (1995) (describing
eloquently how the history of Australian Native Peoples cannot be written into a "dry
narrative of a history text").
160. See PETER SUTTON, NATIVE TITLE AND THE DESCENT OF RIGHTS (1998) (noting how
kinship ties are a key to ensuring that connectedness among Native Peoples remains
intact over time); see also WARREN SHAPIRO, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN ABORIGINAL
AUSTRALIA (1979) (discussing how residence groups, matrilineal ties, moiety systems,
semi-moiety organizations, and conjugal bonds tie members of various groups of
Australian Native Peoples together).
161. See THE SONGLINES, supra note 159, at 106-08 (containing both a Dreaming
narrative and describing the use of song and Songlines which "transmit" the
narrative across the Australian continent).
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"owned" by potentially innumerable Native Peoples.6 2 In these ways,
the Songlines reflect Native Peoples' indelible links with the land,
which transcend the rigid lines of cartographic representations of the
earth. 163
Non-Native peoples are often surprised to learn that while Native
Peoples know their Songlines and can easily follow them (e.g., in
migrating to new places across Australia's vast expanse),' 64 they do
not have authority over them. In other words, their ability to sing the
songs to transfer the knowledge of the Songlines and Dreamings to
others is controlled by individuals with different Songlines and
Dreamings. Thus, Native Peoples have Songlines and Dreamings
which differ from the Songlines and Dreamings they control. This
apparently bifurcated system of "ownership" and "ceremonial
authority"'' is functionally equivalent to a trusteeship with one party
having complete authority over resources owned by another party.
One can also envisage this conjoint relationship as mirroring joint
sovereignty 66 of more than one people over "the land," in which
various Native Peoples are involved in sharing, holding responsibility
for, and maintaining authority over individual "pieces" of land.
Understanding these relationships has proved very difficult for
legal practitioners. In a land case involving the Yirrkala people,
162. See Robert Layton, Ambilineal Descent and Traditional Pitjantjatjara Rights to
Land, in ABORIGINES, LAND, AND LAND RIGHTS 12, 17, fig.2 (Nicolas Peterson & Marcia
Langton eds., 1983); see also Exhibit 12, noted in the Appendix (illustrating Songlines
passing through areas of Central Australia).
163. See PETER READ, BELONGING: AUSTRALIANS, PLACE AND ABORIGINAL OWNERSHIP
(2000); see also Nancy Williams, Yolungu Concepts of Land Ownership, in ABORIGINE
LAND RIGHTS, supra note 159, at 94, 105 (detailing how Australian Native Peoples
effectively (a) establish and recognize ownership under rights of title by Dreamings
and Songlines which bestow land loci on named groups via patrilineal descent lines,
(b) grant subsidiary rights based on intersections of Dreamings and Songlines, and (c)
confirm rights of occupation on ownership and possession, though many of these
rights transcend ownership and, as discussed in the paper infra, would be interpreted
by non-Native Peoples as overriding the owners' rights-albeit these overrides are
always associated with certain duties).
164. See Australia Surveying, supra note 16; see also Norman R. Tindale, Map of
Aboriginal Tribal Boundaries, 1974, available at http://www.samuseum.sa.gov.aul
tindale/ boundariesintro.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2003) (illustrating the vastness of
the Australian continent and Norman R. Tindale's groundbreaking work in the early
1970s illustrating that huge numbers of Native Peoples had lived there since time
immemorial).
165. ABORIGINE LAND RIGHTS, supra note 159, at 73.
166. See Kingsley Palmer, Migration and Rights to Land in the Pilbara, in ABORIGINE
LAND RIGHTS, supra note 159, at 172.
20031
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. and the Commonwealth of Australia,167
the solicitor for the defendants wanted to establish the rights of
access between Moieties for the purpose of hunting. The State's cross-
examination sought to confirm what rights were accorded to
Milirrpum by questioning a Gumatj Person who often hunted on lands
in which Yirritja People lived. The discussion proceeded as follows:
Milirrpum: If I go hunting by myself on [Y]irritja [moiety] land I
ask first, except when I'm hunting with a [Y]irritja man then it's all
right.
Solicitor: Well, when you go to Port Bradshaw [i.e., Yirritja
territory] to hunt, do you ask anybody?
Milirrpum: We Rirratjingu people talk together and then we go.
Solicitor: Yes, but you don't ask any [Y]irritja people?
Milirrpum: The [Y]irritja people hear us [through the Songlines].
Solicitor: Yes, but you don't ask them if you can go there.
Milirrpum: No.
Solicitor: [So] if Munggurruwuy [a [Ylirritja man] goes to Dundas
Point... [on your land] . . . does he ask your permission?
Milirrpum: He tell me, not asks ....
Solicitor: Does he ask your permission?
Milirrpum: He lets me know but he doesn't ask.
Solicitor (later): You would never say 'No' to Munggurruwy... ?
Milirrpum: If there's no trouble, we would say'Yes.
' 68
In this short excerpt, one sees the challenges faced by Milirrpum
to answer the Court's inquires, as well as the Court's inability to fully
understand the dynamic between the Yirritja and Rirratjingu
Peoples. It illustrates well the ways in which Songlines cross,
"authority" over Songlines is held by those other than those who "own"
167. Milirrpum, (1971) 17 FLR 141; see also STEVEN L. DAVIS & JOHN ROBERT VICTOR
PRESCOTT, ABORIGINAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES IN AUSTRALIA 53 (1992)
[hereinafter ABORIGINAL FRONTIERS].
168. ABORIGINAL FRONTIERS, supra note 167, at 53 (emphasis added).
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the Songlines, and the "intricate interconnections of all the activities
of people in the area,"'69 such as in the Dundas Point region.
Native Peoples thus see land and land ownership very differently
from non-Native Peoples. Interestingly, however, many Native
Peoples lived on lands settled by non-Native Peoples largely without
incident for most of Australia's modern history. With the mining
boom and influx of foreign capital in the 1950s and 1960s, things
changed. This second coming of whites to Australia resulted in the
forced removal of Native Peoples and the "legal excision" of Native
Peoples' lands from reserve areas. It consequently forced Native and
non-Native Peoples to start discussing issues of land ownership in
ways which had rarely occurred before. 70 The need for the two "sides"
to come together and understand one another's points of view became
increasingly important. Furthermore, the differences had
ramifications that resulted in Mabo, as well as the NTA, NTAA,
Ward, and Wilson. Only if non-Native Peoples begin to understand
Native Peoples can the law, largely developed by the former, begin to
assist and serve the latter.
B. Lessons from Awas Tingni
Better understanding how land is viewed by Native Peoples
allows one to glean lessons from other jurisdictions addressing
Aboriginal land claims. In this way, one can draw parallels and
identify differences. Two of the most prominent cases in these
regards are Awas Tingni and Delgamuukw, though there are notable
examples of Native land management schemes in Norway, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom, as well Each is considered in the
succeeding section to illustrate more clearly both the errors in Mabo
and how Australia's Native Peoples require a unique solution, which
cannot easily be accomplished by simply morphing "fee simple" legal
conceptions onto "Native Title" claims. Such morphing might work for
some non-Australian native peoples who have relationships with their
lands which more closely parallel non-Native schemes. But
Australia's Native Peoples' situation, as the preceding discussion of
Dreamings and Songlines illustrates, is quite different.
169. Maria Brandl & Michael Walsh, Roots and Branches, or the Far-Flung Net of
Aboriginal Relationships, in ABORIGINES LAND RIGHTS, supra note 159, at 149-54
(1983).
170. IAN PALMER, BUYING BACK THE LAND 1 (1988).
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In Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua,171 the Awas Tingni Indigenous
Community successfully argued before the Inter-American Court on
Human Rights that Nicaragua had breached its constitutional
commitments by granting logging rights to a Korean Company on
aboriginal Awas Tingni land which had been neither demarcated nor
recognized by the state. In an unprecedented win for Native Peoples,
the Court held against Nicaragua because it had denied the Awas
Tingni's collective rights to property and failed to provide the Awas
Tingni People with both adequate judicial protection 172 and equal
protection under the law. The Court subsequently ordered Nicaragua
to demarcate the traditional lands of the Awas Tingni, establish new
legal mechanisms to demarcate the traditional lands of all indigenous
communities in Nicaragua, and compensate the Awas Tingni
accordingly.173  The case was deemed "precedent setting"174 and an
"unprecedented legal victory for Indigenous peoples' 175 with "far
reaching" implications 176 destined to carry significant "weight"1'
around the world. While it will be clear below that the extent of the
Awas Tingni's success may be limited to countries under the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court and Native Peoples who
display settlement characteristics which allow for a synonymous
translation of traditional Native practices into easily recognizable
black-letter property laws, the case was an extraordinary victory for
Native Peoples. It also was symbolically significant since it was the
171. Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) (2001).
172. Id. 134. The Court found that previous protections were "illusory and
ineffective."
173. Id. T 173.
174. Court Tells Nicaragua to Pay Damages to Indians, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Sept. 18,
2001, available at http://www.indianlaw.org body-awas-tingni-pr.-reuters.htm (last
visited Oct. 27, 2003).
175. Heloisa Griggs et al., Amazon Alliance for Indigenous and Traditional Peoples of
the Amazon Basin, AMAZON UPDATE, Oct. 2001, at http://www.amazon
alliance.orglupdate/2001 upd oct0_en.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
176. Martin Edwin Andersen, Thankful for Renewed Rights, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2001, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/body-awas tingni-prwash
times.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003); see also Marianela Jimenez, International
Court Rules Against Nicaragua in Territorial Dispute with Indian Group, AP
WORLDSTREAM, Sept. 18, 2001, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/
body awas tingni-pr-ap.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
177. Brian Stempeck, Nicaragua: Rare Hemispheric Court Ruling Gives Land Back to
Natives, GREENWIRE, Sept. 21, 2001, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/
body awas tingni-pr-greenwire.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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first time a Court with a wide-ranging jurisdiction had ever exercised
its authority to recognize the aboriginal title of indigenous peoples.
Essentially, the Court recognized the Awas Tingni's rights in theaesojuiil . 178 179 8
areas of judicial protection, property, and remedies,"o basing its
findings on both the American Convention on Human Rights
(ACHR)1"' and the domestic Nicaraguan Constitution. While these
findings were largely based on Anglo-American legal conceptions,
they effectively address the Awas Tingni's situation. Article 21 of the
ACHR, for example, states that "[elveryone has the right to the use
and enjoyment of his property." Furthermore, Article 21 states, "the
law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of
society."82 The Court thus employed the Anglo-American conception
of land as something that is owned (as opposed to shared), albeit by
an individual or group. This ensured that while the Court held in the
Awas Tingni's favor, it expressly did not "support collective property
rights, per se."'8 3  This approach found parallels in the Court's
application of Articles 5 and 89 of the Nicaraguan Constitution, which
read:
Article 5. [The State] recognizes the existence of the indigenous
peoples who enjoy the rights, obligations and guarantees allocated
in the Constitution, especially those that maintain and develop
their identity and culture ... so as to maintain the communalS 184
forms, enjoyment, use, and benefit of their lands.
Article 89. [The State] also recognizes the enjoyment, use and
benefit of the waters and forests of their communal lands.'8 5
In its holding the Court thus viewed lands as clearly divisible,
recognizing that while the community did not have any "real property
title deed to the land it claim[ed] ,"16 it deserved some title on the
178. See generally Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. § VIII.
179. See id. § IX.
180. See id. § XI.
181. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123
[hereinafter ACHRI.
182. ACHR, supra note 181, art. 21 (emphasis added).
183. Ismene Zarifis, News From the Inter-American System, HUM. RTS. BR. (2002),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief09/2system.cfm (last visited Oct. 27,
2003).
184. NicAR. CONST. art. 5.
185. NICAR. CONST. art. 89.
186. Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) (2001), 103(g).
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basis that its "activities" 1 7 were "carried out within a territorial space
in accordance with a traditional collective form of organization."1
8
Therefore, even though there were "overlaps"'89 of communal lands
claimed by indigenous communities of the Atlantic Coast, the State
could determine what land belonged to which groups.
This approach carries significant import in the degree to which it
is limited to groups that, unlike Australia's Native Peoples, can be
seen as geographically limited to defined spaces which lend
themselves to an application of freehold title. The keys to the Awas
Tigni's success were that the land had traditionally been used and
occupied by the group,' 9° Nicaragua itself had recognized the
"communal property of indigenous peoples,"' 9' and the Awas Tingni
could be easily seen to "have a communal property right to the lands
they currently inhabit.",92 This led to the soundness of the court's
requirement for "demarcation" for the Awas Tingni, since if Nicaragua
did not demarcate Awas Tingni lands, then their "territorial rights"
would clearly have remained uncertain.' 93 Obvious questions arise if
one cannot clearly limit such rights if the "ownership" is marked by
shifting reference points (e.g., Songlines), authority and control are
not fully vested (e.g., Dreamings and Songlines are under the
authority of individuals who do not "own" them), and individuals
cannot "inhabit" the land by virtue of their lifestyles (e.g.,
hunter/gatherers) or geographic constraints (e.g., parched Central
Australian deserts). In these regards, the legal arguments in favor of
the Awas Tingni have no practical import for Australian Native
Peoples, who cannot demonstrate clear control over specific pieces of
land.
A closer look at the Court's holdings reinforces this pessimism
vis-A-vis Awas Tingni's inapplicability to differentiate situated
187. Id. 103(e) (listing "family farming and communal agriculture, fruit gathering
and medicinal plants, hunting and fishing" among the Awas Tingni's activities).
188. Id.
189. Id. 103(f).
190. Nicaraguan Indigenous Organizations, Communities, and Representatives,
Amicus brief for the Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo) Indigenous Community, available
at http://www.indianlaw.orgbody-atintroeng.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003)
(emphasis added).
191. Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 152.
192. Id. 153 (emphasis added).
193. Press Release, Indian Law Resource Center, Landmark Victory for Indians in
International Human Rights Case Against Nicaragua (Sept. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.indianlaw.orgbody-iachr decision.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
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indigenous groups. First, the Court unanimously requests that
Nicaragua abstain from any activities which might affect the
"existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the
geographic area where the members of the Awas Tingni Community
live and carry out their activities,19 4 underscoring the importance of
the Awas Tingni residency in a clearly demarcated place.' 95 Because
the "lives of the members of the Awas Tingni community" relied
"substantially on the agriculture, game, and fishing" that they carried
out in "areas bordering their villages" 96 (i.e., anthropologists could
freely enter the community and cite easily definable "territory" and
"commons"), the Court was able to interpret conservatively Article 21
of the ACHR. The expert opinion by anthropologist and sociologist
Rodolfo Gruenbaum'9 7 supports this conservative approach since it
included few references about spiritually significant lands, which may
change over time. He states "land is an essential tie which provides
and maintains the cultural identity" of the Indigenous peoples in
Nicaragua and is "part of a geographic and social, symbolic and
religious space, with which the history and current dynamics of those
people are linked."198 However, he also notes how land is "not a mere
instrument of agricultural production," 99 suggesting that this
criterion is the base from which the other conclusions stem. Remove
the base, as in the case of Australian Native Peoples who did not
pursue agriculture on Australia's desert plains,'2° and one wonders
194. Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. T 173(4) (emphasis added).
195. See Danielle Knight, Nicaragua Honors Court Ruling on Indigenous People,
INDIAN LAW NEWSWIRE, Feb. 25, 2002, available at http://www.indianlaw.org
body awas..tingni-pr-ips2.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003) (media reports underscored
the significance of demarcation, as well, partly due to its recognizable import to non-
Native Peoples vis-&-vis clearly defined land rights); see also Danielle Knight,
Nicaraguan Tribe Sets Indigenous Rights Precedent, IPS NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 19,
2002, available at http://www.proutworld.org/news (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
196. Claudio Grossman, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the Inter-
American System, HUM. RTS. BR. (2001), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/
hrbrief/08/3tingni.cfm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003); see also Indian Law Resource
Center, Human Rights Court to Rule on Indian Land Rights Case Against the
Government of Nicaragua, APA NEWSLETTER, Feb. 4, 2000, available at
http://www.sdnp.org.gy/apafhumanrightsnicaragua.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2003).
197. See Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. T 83(d).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, THE HEALTH AND WELFARE OF
AUSTRALIA'S ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIN ISLANDER PEOPLES: 2001 13-15 (2001),
available at http://www.aihw.gov.au/publications/ihwfhwaatsipOl/hwaatsip0l-cOl.pdf
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whether their Native Title claims would still have any "bite" under
the Awas Tingni formulation.
On the other hand, the Court's holding lays out many key
principles that, to the Court's credit, imply openness to new ideas that
transcend traditional legal formulations. In its opinion, for example,
the Court writes:
Given the characteristics of the instant case, some specifications
are required on the concept of property in indigenous communities.
Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition
regarding a communal form of collective property of the land, in the
sense that ownership of the land is not centered on an individual
but rather on the group and its community. Indigenous groups, by
the fact of their very existence, have the right to live freely in their
own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land must
be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic
survival. For indigenous communities, relations to the land are not
merely a matter of possession and production but a material and
spiritual element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their
201
cultural legacy and transmit it to future generations.
In these regards, issues of "securing access, '20 2 which would
indeed apply to Australia's Native Peoples, would have import and
assuredly be subsumed under a recognition of a group's need to
uphold and strengthen their community. Second, the Court's focus
that establishing an "effective mechanism for delimitation,
demarcation, and titling" of the Awas Tingni land is to take place "in
accordance with their customary law, values, customs, and mores"
20 3
inevitably requires and encourages a certain degree of cooperation
with the government. Both comprise key requisite steps towards any
true form of reconciliation and understanding.
Awas Tingni has several other positive implications for
Australian Native Peoples' quest for Native Title and true
reconciliation. First, while the decision in Awas Tingni applies a
paradigm of aboriginal land ownership which is limited by the
requirement that land must be titled by Native Peoples, albeit
(last visited Nov. 29, 2003) (illustrating that the SATs with the largest proportion of
Native Peoples-measured as a percent of the total population of the SATs-are in
Australia's central regions).
201. Awas Tingni, 79 Inter-Am. C.H.R. T1 149 (emphasis added).
202. Id. 83(k).
203. Id. T 173(3) (emphasis added).
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communally owned, 4 it reiterates key values which must ground any
reconciliation agreements between Native and non-Native Australian
Peoples. Indeed, the Court took the bold step of interpreting the
ACHR as explicitly including "indigenous concepts."205 The Court also
recognized the argument made by two amici that:
The intrinsic connections between land, environment, life, religion,
identity, and culture, are so deeply rooted that it is not possible to
provide an effective and adequate protection of a single right, such
as the right to property, without considering other rights such as
the right to life, identity, culture, and religion.2°8
These amici further highlight how the rights to property
inherently intersect with the rights to a healthy environment,2 07 right
to culture, 2" and right to participate in government. 9 Thus, there
may be times when traditional legal approaches need to be
reformulated to recognize "basic human rights,"'21 including: life;
equality before the law; effective judicial remedies; residence and
movement; religious freedom and worship; cultural benefits; self-
determination; freedom from discrimination; health; clean
environments; freedom from interference with one's home; minority
rights; and identity rights.21 ' Surely, these formulations set standards
that require and compel polities to find ways to recognize property
that transcends a "ditch" or a "swath of jungle, 212 as a dividing line.
Australia's NTA therefore fails because it limits Native People's
dignity.
204. Other "standard" forms of property formulations such as tenants in common,
joint tenancies, tenancy by the entireties, and tenancies in partnership would also be
permissible.
205. International Human Rights Law Group & the Center for International
Environmental Law, Brief of Amici Curiae for the Awas Tingni Mayagna (Sumo)
Indigenous Community, at http://www.cedha.org.ar/docs/curiael.htm (last visited Oct.
27, 2003) [hereinafter IHRLG].
206. Id.
207. Id. at 11.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Id. at 17.
210. Id. at 6.
211. IHRLG, supra note 205, at 9.
212. Catherine Elton, Indians' Heritage Gets Legal Stamp, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR NEWSWIRE (Boston), Dec. 4, 2001, available at http://www.indianlaw.org/
body-awas-tingni-p r-csmonitor.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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C. Lessons from Delgamuukw
Like Awas Tingni, Canada's Delgamuukw decision also addresses
Native Peoples' rights and provides valuable insights into ways
Australia should and could go about addressing Native Title and
reconciliation issues with its Native Peoples. The fact that Canada,
like Australia, shares close ties with Great Britain means Canadian
court decisions carry additional weight in Australia's courts. Both
countries are young, geographically large, economically developed,
have very few people (compared to their landmasses),213 and are facing
the challenge of building multicultural identities and achieving
reconciliation to varying extents with their respective Native Peoples.
For example, on October 3, 2002, Philip Ruddock, then the Minister of
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and currently
Attorney General of Australia, met with his Canadian counterpart
Robert Nault in Canada to discuss ways the government can help
2 " 215Native Peoples address challenges in the health,2 14 economic, andm 216
social realms. In Canada, like Australia, the fears of recognizing
213. Australia's Bureau of Statistics reported Australia's population at 19,764,613 as
of 1:37 PM on Oct. 20, 2002, making it still the least densely populated country on
earth. Australian Bureau of Statistics, available at www.abs.gov.aulAusstats (last
visited Dec. 1, 2003).
214. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 200, at 12; see also
AUSTRALIAN INSTITUTE OF HEALTH AND WELFARE, AUSTRALIA'S HEALTH: 1998 (Janette
Whelan Publishing Consultancy ed., 1999) (illustrating that Australian Native People
have higher mortality rates in rural areas corresponding to low life expectancies;
significantly higher peri-natal deaths among Native Australian mothers than non-
Native Australian mothers; smoking is higher among Native Peoples; and higher
public health expenditures for Native Peoples than for others on a per capita basis);
see also Exhibit 13 (containing a political cartoon (bottom right) portraying Native
People's apparent suicides as actually stemming from a series of greater, more
profound social ills); see also Adam Lamrozik, The 'Free' Labour Market,
Unemployment, and Crime, in CULTURES OF CRIME AND VIOLENCE 196 (Judith Bessant
et al. eds., 1995) (illustrating how Native Peoples comprise a disproportionate
number of prisoners throughout Australia's states and territories); see also Peter
Khoury, Aborigines and the Politics of Alcohol, in AUSTRALIAN WELFARE: HISTORICAL
SOCIOLOGY 216 (Richard Kennedy ed., 1989) (discussing the effects of alcohol on
Aboriginal communities).
215. See Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Housing Survey, 1999, available
at http://www.abs.gov.au/usstats/abs@.nsf/0/53afld370fc826feca256988007bf6a9?
OpenDocument (citing statistics which illustrate the effects of economic challenges
faced by Australian Native Peoples) (last visited Nov. 29, 2003).
216. See Australia, Canada compare notes on indigenous health, poverty, ABC NEWS
ONLINE, Oct. 3, 2002, at http://abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s692009.htm (last visited
Nov. 6, 2003) (noting that even though Canada spends $8 billion annually, its 1.4
million indigenous people "remain plagued by poverty, often-deplorable living
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Native Title also hang "like a large, undefined cloud over title to land
and resources .... 17  In these regards, it is an understatement to
refer to the "task of accommodating the rights of colonized peoples
within a contemporary political and legal rights regime" as simply
"demanding';2181 it has been all consuming.
The historical context of Delgamuukw goes back to when British
colonialists first entered into treaties with First Nation Peoples219 in
the early 1600s. On October 7, 1763, the British Crown acknowledged
in a proclamation that it retained sovereignty of Canada's indigenous
peoples as "Nations" under the Crown's protection. The treaty
prevented the selling of any of the First Nation Lands to private
interests and established a system for government acquisition of the
lands, as needed. This was followed, from 1763-1850, by a period of
land cessions from which reserves were created and native rights
extinguished. Confederation in 1867 brought with it the British
North America Act, giving the Federal Government exclusive
220
responsibility for the lands. In 1888, the Canadian Supreme Court
held in St. Katherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen, that
Indian Title existed after a Royal Proclamation in 1763. Claims
processes were consequently implemented, though were of little use
and ignored until 1973, when in Calder v. Attorney Gen. of British
Columbia,222 the Supreme Court of Canada decided that First Nation
Peoples "have a legal and inherent right to lands where their title has
been neither surrendered nor extinguished."2 3  A new and
conditions, high rates of suicide and health problems"; this has led Canada to see the
"plight of First Nations" as a "painful embarrassment" even though it is "widely
considered to be one of the world's most advanced countries.").
217. Owen Lippert, Delgamuukw Decision Will Create BC-style Aboriginal Land
Claims Across Canada, The Fraser Institute, Aug. 8, 2000, at httpJ/oldfraser.lexi.net
media/ mediareleases/2000/20000808.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
218. Catherine Bell, Canadian Supreme Court: Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, 37
I.L.M. 261, 261 (1998) (footnote omitted).
219. The term "First Nation Peoples" is used to describe Canada's Native Peoples
from this point forward, consistent with the use of the term "First Nations" in Canada
as the homelands of Canada's indigenous population.
220. COUNCIL FOR ABORIGINAL RECONCILIATION, MAKING THINGS RIGHT:
RECONCILIATION AFTER THE HIGH COURT'S DECISION OF NATIVE TITLE 33-34 (1993),
available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/car/1993/10 (last visited
Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter MAKING THINGS RIGHT].
221. St. Katherine's Milling and Lumber Co., [1888] 14 App. Cas. 46.
222. Calder, [1973] 34 DLR 145.
223. Policy.ca, First Nations, at http://www.policy.calbclfirstnations.htm (last visited
Oct. 30, 2003).
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comprehensive land claims process was introduced, followed by a
constitutional amendment in 1982 fully embodying aboriginal
224
rights.
The Gitskan and Wet'Suwet'En First Nation Peoples in British
Columbia, asserting a joint claim for ownership and jurisdiction over
certain lands, brought Delgamuukw before the Court in 1997.225 They
also took issue with the trial judge's exclusion of historical and
traditional oral evidence as inadmissible under the rules of evidence.
The Canadian Supreme Court's holding in Delgamuukw had five
key parts, of which the first three find parallels in Mabo and its
progeny and the latter two transcend Australia's current Native Title
limitations. First, the Court in Delgarnuukw found that Native Title
was inalienable and could not be transferred, sold, or surrendered to
126
anyone other than the Crown. Second, it held that all Native Title
was held communally.227 Third, it upheld the common law standard of
occupation as proof of possession;228 "the test for identification of
Aboriginal Title" thus has the "requirement of occupancy"229 which
requires exclusive occupation. 2' ° The test does allow for the possibility
of exclusive joint occupation of lands between two First Nations
groups, but never three or more.23' Fourth, the Court lambasted the
trial judge for failing to accord due weight to oral testimony which
formed the basis of the Gitskan and Wet'Suwet'En First Nations'
claims. And fifth, and most tellingly, the Court widened the scope of
Native Title by holding that exclusive Native Title rights to use land
were not restricted only to the right to engage in activities which were
aspects of "[aboriginal] practice[s], custom[s], and tradition[s] integral
to... aboriginal culture.2 2 Instead, the only limit was that the land
224. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. II, § 35(1).
225. Specifically, the case was brought on behalf of fifty-one hereditary chiefs of most
houses of the Gitskan and Wet'Suwet'En First Nation Peoples regarding the
ownership of 133 land parcels comprising 58,000 km2. See Carrier Sekani Tribal
Council, Delgamuukw: A Summary of the Supreme Court of Canada Decision, at
http://www.cstc.bc.ca/pagesiTreaty-delgmkwsmry.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003)
[hereinafter Sekani Council]; British Columbia Treaty Commission, A Lay Person's
Guide to Delgamuukw, at http://www.bctreaty.net/files-2/pdfldocuments/delga
muukw.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
226. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, 91 113.
227. Id. 114.
228. Id. 115.
229. Id. 142.
230. Id. 155.
231. Id. 196.
232. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 80.
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could not be used in a manner which was irreconcilable with the
nature of the claimants' attachments to the lands, thus opening the
door for Native Title rights to encompass fully mineral rights and
other exploitative uses which were clearly not "traditional uses" in
any fair use of the term.
While Delgamuukw's holdings are not inapposite to Australia's
current Native Title regime, they provide three key lessons, all of
which Australia is well advised to heed if it is to achieve true
reconciliation with its Native Peoples. Each is considered in turn.
Delgamuukw's first lesson is that negotiation is the key to
reconciliation. Despite the fact Delgamuukw could be deemed a "win"
for First Nation Peoples, the Supreme Court of Canada actually
remanded the case back to the trial court and never decided if the
land, in fact, was First Nation Land.2 3 Chief Justice Lamar writes in
Delgamuukw, "it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith
and give and take on all sides... that we will achieve.., the
reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the
sovereignty of the Crown. '23 4  This is the only way to overcome
seemingly "unsurmountable hurdles" in Native/Non-Native
relations23 5 and avoids the dead-ends implied by injunctions and other
litigious means.23 6 Australia could easily benefit from heeding this
approach, especially given the degree to which it eschewed the RTN in
the NTAA.
Delgamuukw's second lesson is that adequately addressing
Native Title requires transcending apparent limitations, a lesson it
233. See Paul Tennant, Life Goes On: First Nations and Municipalities After
Delgamuukw, Address to the Greater Vancouver Chapter of the Institute of Public
Administration of Canada (Apr. 26, 1998), at http://arcbc.tripod.comfdelg-tennant.htm
(last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
234. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 186.
235. Melvin H. Smith, The Delgamuukw Case: What Does it Mean and What Do We
Do Now?, The Fraser Institute, at http://oldfraser.lexi.net/publications/pps/
10/s8_summary.html (last modified Aug. 23, 2000).
236. See J. L. Hunter, Advancing Aboriginal Claims After Delgamuukw: The Role of
the Injunction, Presented at the Continuing Legal Education Conference on
Litigating Aboriginal Title (June 2000) (on file with the author); see also Statement of
the Relationship Between the White Mountain Apache Tribe and the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (USFWS), Dec. 6, 1994, noted in DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIAL ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 733-34 (4th ed. 1998) [hereinafter MFIL]
(reflecting an agreement between the Native American Apache Tribe and an arm of
the United States Government, the USFWS, in working to build an improved
relationship and avoid legal haggling over implementing Federal environmental
regulations on Native American Indian lands).
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only partially embraces itself. The locus of this lesson is the degree to
which the Delgamuukw court acknowledges the ability of First
Nations to jointly occupy lands, suggesting that the seemingly
stalwart requirement of exclusive occupation 23 does not mean
complete exclusivity.
The opinion also does not go far enough, limiting itself by
explicitly excluding three or more groups from being able to share
Native Title, apparently seeing such a move as too daring, if not
unnecessary, given the nature of First Nation Peoples' claims. Surely,
Australian Native Peoples' Songlines would necessitate a more
comprehensive understanding of land rights since it is apparent that
one could not attempt to address the needs of hundreds, if not
thousands, of individual Native groups over 10,000 km of desert.23
In response to this concern, the Court in Degamuukw refers to "site-
specific rights.23 9 However, this would be inapplicable in Australia
due to the nature of Songlines. At the very least, the Delgamuukw
court suggests that creative options could be attempted and one needs
only the courage to try.
Finally, Delgamuukw's third lesson is that respecting Native
Peoples' rights demands changing one's demands. Oral testimony
must be admitted so that "co-equality" and "principles of diplomacy"
are accorded to First Nation Peoples. Ensuring that oral histories of
First Nation Peoples would never be "systematic[ally]" 240 under-
evaluated, the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the challenges created by the use of oral histories
as proof of historical facts, the laws of evidence must be adapted in
order that this type of evidence can be accommodated and placed on
an equal footing with the types of historical evidence that courts
241
are familiar with, which largely consists of historical documents.
237. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 1155.
238. See Tindale, supra note 164; see also JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL:
THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 311 (1997) (noting how "Aboriginal Australia
consisted of a sea of very sparely populated desert separating ... ecological 'islands,'
each of them holding only a fraction of the continent's population and with
interactions attenuated by the intervening distance.").
239. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 91 138.
240. See Sekani Council, supra note 225; see also Brian Thorn, Aboriginal Rights and
Title in Canada After Delgamuukw: Anthropological Perspectives, at
http://home.istar.ca/-bthom/rights.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
241. Delgarnuukw, 3 S.C.R. 1 87.
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One wonders in these respects if the Court's equating
"sovereignty" with the "honour of the Crown '2 42 could be implicitly
extended to the "honour" of First Nation Peoples and Native Peoples
in Australia.
These lessons enable one to begin forming a sense of an
alternative, more complete Native Title regime in Australia. Such a
regime would respect Native Peoples by enabling them to exercise
243their rights to self-determination over their traditional territories,
which would be truly inalienable.244 Furthermore, it would be built on
principles of negotiation instead of litigation, thus recognizing the
import of dialogue and the importance of individuals working together
to find solutions to their problems.245 Third, the regime would
recognize the inherent "shared exclusivity2 46 which is implied by
Songlines and accommodates "non-exclusive Aboriginal rights'2
47
given the history of European and, more apt today, global
settlement.24' This approach has its genesis in Justice Hucheon's
comments that land should permit "a number of uses... if exclusivity
cannot be proved" and the "common law should develop to recognize
aboriginal rights as they were recognized by either de facto practice or
by aboriginal systems of governance."249 In Australia, this implies a
new regime which could accord with certain "inherent limit[s]" on
lands that should not or cannot be "used in a manner that is
irreconcilable with the nature of the.., attachments to those
lands."250 While the Court in Delgamuukw appears to hypocritically
posit that Native Title is "not equated with fee simple ownership" and
"cannot be described with reference to traditional property law
242. Id. 29, 35 & 203.
243. See James Tully, The Panel on the Meaning of Aboriginal Title: Two Visions of
Aboriginal Title and Reconciliation, Aboriginal Rights Coalition of British Columbia,
at http://arcbc.tripod.com/delgl.htm (last updated Apr. 13, 2002).
244. See Paul Joffe, Assessing the Delgamuukw Principles: National Implications and
Potential Effects in Quebec, 45 MCGILL L.J. 155, 182-88 (2000).
245. This is not meant to sound trite, reflected in the Chief Justice's statement that
"the Crown is under a moral if not a legal duty to enter into and conduct...
negotiations" with Aboriginal peoples in "good faith." Wally Braul, ARC Victoria's
Interpretation of Delgamuukw, Aboriginal Rights Coalition of British Columbia, at
http://arcbc.tripod.com/delgl.htm (last updated Apr. 13, 2002).
246. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 158.
247. Id. T 38, 47.
248. See Exhibit 14, noted in the Appendix (illustrating the diversity of countries from
which Australians now come).
249. Delgamuukw, 3 S.C.R. 159 (emphasis added).
250. Id. 124.
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concepts" because it is "personal" and "generally inalienable except to
the Crown," 251 the fact remains that the Delgamuukw Court requires
Aboriginal societies to "specify the area that has been continuously
used and occupied"252 by identifying key boundaries.2 5' In any new
Native Title regime in Australia, this restriction needs to be
transcended. Only then can the import of Dreamings and Songlines
be fully accorded their due.
D. Lessons from Other Jurisdictions2
4
Additional lessons informing an alternative approach to
addressing Native Title in Australia can be gleaned from jurisdictions
other than Canada and Nicaragua. Norway's approaches with the
Sdmi People, New Zealand's experiences with the Maori People, and
the United Kingdom's management of its "public pathway" system
throughout the United Kingdom each give one a sense of elements
which other polities have considered in addressing their own
indigenous needs. Each is considered in turn.
Norway's experiences with the Stmi People parallels Australia's
challenges managing Native Title after Mabo, though Norway has
more straightforwardly addressed key challenges. 55 The Sdmi are a
251. Id. T 190.
252. Id. 195.
253. But consider the Court's recognizing that "occupancy" can refer to the "use of...
even remote territories to pursue a traditional mode of life." Id. 199. In response,
the fact remains that the land must still be firmly and solidly "bounded" subject to the
constraints on joint "ownership."
254. Special thanks to Carol Rose, the Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor of Law and
Organization at the Yale Law School, for recommending an examination of (a) the
Sdmi in Norway and (b) the public footpaths in Britain for ideas which could be
applied to managing Native Title in Australia.
255. Finland has also faced challenges in respecting the rights of Sdmi People in its
territory, as well, though its challenges have been minimized by the small number of
Sdmi in its territory (6,500) compared to Norway (45,000). Finland, for example,
passed the Constitution Act of Finland (969/1995) recognizing the SAmi as an
indigenous people with the right to use the Simi language in any contracts with the
government and, subject to the Parliament Act (1928/7 amended 1991/1079) to be
heard in any Parliamentary proceedings addressing matters of consequence to them.
On January 1, 1996, the Constitution Act (973/95) was amended to guarantee the
Sdmi cultural autonomy in the Sdmi homelands (see § 51(a)) and the Decree of SAmi
Parliament of 1973 was elevated to an Act of Parliament with the former Sdmi
Parliament officially renamed the Simi Thing. See Elina Helander, The Sdmi of
Norway, at http://www.reisenett.no/norway/facts/culture-science/sami.html (last
visited Oct. 18. 2003); see also United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Core Document Forming Part of the Reports of State Parties: Finland,
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Laplander Herdspeople who have practiced "reindeer pastoralism" for
all of recorded history.26 For years, Norway's approach to the Sdmi
was largely ambiguous, "paying lip service" to their status as
indigenous peoples and "avoiding the legal and political consequences"
of any formal recognition.5 7 Matters dramatically changed with the
(a) Reindeer Herding Act of 1971 (holding S~imi as "privileged
reindeer herders" under all reindeer statutes (renniringslagen)); (b)
Taxed Mountains (Skatteffillsmflet) Case281 (affirming that the Sdmi
had a property "firm right of use" of the southern portion of the Taxed
Mountains and might have complete ownership of more northern
areas); (c) Sdmi Act of 1987259 (establishing a S.mi Assembly with
powers to discuss and make pronouncements on matters relevant to
the S~mi People);2 60 and, most prominently, (d) Parliament's 261
ratification of a Constitutional amendment in 1988262 which upheld
Norway's responsibility of assisting the Sdmi people.263 Therefore, for
years the combination of "recognition and denial"26 which had existed
was pushed aside in a series of steps which, at their core, not only
recognized what the central government should give to the S.mi, but
how it should interact with the Semi given the Sa.mi's ability to
govern themselves.
New Zealand's experience with the Maori People parallels
Norway's recent approach toward the S.mi, though dates back to
1840. Partly a result of the Maori People's incredible resilience and
HRIICORE/1/Add.59/Rev.2, (1998) at http://www.unhchr.chltbs/doc.nsf/l0/bcd32dcbe53
c57198025668a003a7c42?Opendocument (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
256. See An introduction to the Sami people, available at http://www/itv.se
boreale/samiengl.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2003) (illustrating where the Sdmi live);
see also T. Brantenberg, The End of Thirteen Years of Silence. The Sdmi Land Rights
Issue in Norway, 4 IWGIA NEWSL. (Oct./Dec.).
257. Far Korsmo, Swedish Policy and Saami Rights, 11 THE N. REV. 32, 33 (1993).
258. Skattei AllsmAlet, Nytt Juridiski Arkiv 1981: 1.
259. Shmi Act No. 56, 12 June 1987.
260. See United Nations High Committee on the Rights of the Child, 6th Sess.,
Summary Record of the 150th Meeting: Norway, CRC/C/SR.150, (1994), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/e42f535e0cc6063b41256151003944af?Ope
ndocument (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
261. Also called the Stortling (i.e., the National Assembly of Norway).
262. See NOR. CONST. art. 110(a) (stating "[i]t is the responsibility of the authorities of
the State to create conditions enabling the Sdmi people to preserve and develop its
language, culture, and way of life."). Id.
263. The late King Olav V opened the Sdmi Parliament, the Sameting, on Oct. 9,
1989.
264. Korsmo, supra note 257, at 33.
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New Zealand's remote location, the British signed the Treaty of
Waitangi with the Maori People on February 6, 1840. Under the
Treaty, the Maori agreed to accept British sovereignty in return for
full, exclusive, and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates,
forests, fisheries, and other properties under the exercise of their own
chieftainship (te tino rangatiratanga). While the New Zealand
Parliament has never officially ratified the Treaty, the Treaty of
Waitangi Act of 1975 firmly established the Waitangi Tribunal to
ensure that Maori interests regarding any land claims were assessed
fairly. Consisting of half-Maori and half-non-Maori People, and the
Chief Judge of the Maori Land Court as Chair, the Tribunal meets at
Marae 65 to accommodate Maori claimants and discuss their
grievances. Unlike Australia's Native Peoples, the Maori have
traditional concepts of land which could be more easily morphed onto
Anglo-American concepts, at least vis-A-vis geographic locations being
firmly bounded and "dimensions" of the rights associated with land2
"owned" by individual actors.267 However, what is most telling in the
New Zealand system is the high degree of respect it accords Maori
People in resolving disputes. In this way, it reflects the spirit of
Waitangi by treating the Maori People as full-fledged equals in
government negotiations.
The implications of "equal treatment" are most readily apparent
when land is simply "turned over" to Native Peoples who claim
ownership. However, the case of Great Britain's management of
public pathways illustrates how lands carrying significant cultural,
historical, and symbolic import have been managed conjointly with
more modern "fee simple" schemes. Indeed, the immense network of
public pathways existing in Great Britain date back to at least the 9th
and 10th Centuries when individuals needed ways to easily navigate
the countryside. While many modern roads currently trace these age-
old footpaths, many do not. This stems from the footpaths' often
circuitous routes that traverse mountains, moors, heaths, and downs.
265. Traditional, communal meeting places for Maori Peoples.
266. Among the dimensions referenced are the right to use (a) certain parts of a land
parcel (b) in certain ways (e.g., swimming in a given stream or sitting under a certain
tree). These rights are divided in Maori traditions, though are clearly bounded in
that they ascribe to a certain activities on certain pieces of land (e.g., swimming as
opposed to catching fish in a certain stream, and sitting as opposed to climbing a
certain tree).
267. Stuart Banner, Two Properties, One Land: Law and Space in Nineteenth Century
New Zealand, 24 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 807, 812-13 (1999), reprinted in PERSPECTIVES
IN PROPERTY LAW 321 (Robert C. Ellickson et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2002).
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Traditionally, the paths took the forms of "public rights of way"
through private fee simple lands by inferred easements of the Crown.
In 1949, the National Parks & Access to the Countryside Act
(NPACA) sought to record and confirm the location of these public
footpaths in the interest of "heritage" and in the face of "increasing
urbanization and the intensification of agriculture." 68 In other words,
the Act recognized the value of a culturally important, land-based
resource of Britain's Native Peoples that demanded attention-the
footpaths-despite economic development and despite alternative
uses of the land on which the footpaths were located. The "rights" of
footpath users were clearly reiterated and defined, along with
mechanisms available to fee simple owners who had issues with the
footpaths' running through their territory (e.g., conflicts of use or
nuisances).
The Countryside and Rights of Way Act (CRWA) of 2000 updated
the 1949 Act by providing Local Councils with the powers to manage
diversion, extinguishment, creation, and modification of the routes.27
Its goals were ensuring the "public's ability to enjoy the countryside
whilst also providing safeguards for landowners and occupiers."
271
The Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
highlighted that the Act "will create a new statutory right of access
and modernize the rights of way system as well as giving greater
protection to Sites of Special Scientific Interest (SSSIs), providing
better management arrangements for Areas of Outstanding Natural
Beauty (AONBs) and strengthening wildlife enforcement
legislation. 272  Like the NPACA, the CRWA codified the ways in
268. National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, c. 97, § 5 (Eng.).
269. Three categories of path were defined in the Act: (a) footpaths (rights of way for
pedestrians only), (b) bridleways (for horse-riders and cyclists), and (c) byways (i.e.,
roads used as public paths and typically old carriageways now used mainly by non-
motorized traffic). Isle of Wight Council, Council Duties in Relation to Public Rights
of Way, at http://www.iwight.com/ living-here/getting-around/data/1-2/1-2a.htm (last
visited Oct. 30, 2003).
270. Countryside and Rights of Way Act, 2000, c. 37, sched. 6 (Eng.). [hereinafter
CRWAI; see also Karen Berger, Birth of a Trail, Camp the World, at
http://www.camptheworld.com/EUROPE.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2003) (writing how
the "English have.., ideas . . . that ... [others] would be well to borrow, like their
system of public footpaths, which pass by easement through private lands"). Id.
271. Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs, Countryside Legislation:
Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000: Fact Sheet, Fact Sheet 1: Overview, at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-countryside/cllbill/factsheet/ (last visited Oct. 30,
2003).
272. Id.
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which mandatory easements, directly under sovereign Crown control,
were to exist throughout Britain in the interests of Britain's Native
Peoples. In many cases, these rights were bridled: some footpaths, for
example, were limited to foot traffic; others could be closed by
landowners up to twenty-eight days each year for the landowners'
personal uses with adequate public notice; and cultivated land could
1273be exempted, if approved by the local Council. The footpaths,
however, reflected the Sovereign's duty to respect Native heritage,
trumping the authority of fee simple owners as needed.
E. An Alternative Approach: Conjoint Sovereignty with Mandated
Easements
An alternative approach to Australia's current Native Title
system requires overhauling the current system, though this need not
be as radical as the word "overhaul" suggests. It would take to heart
the very best lessons of Awas Tingni, Delgamuukw, and the dealings
with the Sdmi, Maori, and British peoples; and it would avoid the
pitfalls. It would integrate principles of inclusion and respect for
Native and non-Native Peoples alike, while according with key legal
doctrines-though extending them, too. It would challenge
individuals by forcing them to try something new, though it would
have built-in control mechanisms to deal with inevitable frustrations.
It would ensure that current, traditional arrangements are not
threatened, allaying the fears of those wondering whether it would
have negative results, though ensure that key issues currently
ignored are addressed. It would also be the first step toward
achieving reconciliation between Australia's Native and non-Native
Peoples-a goal currently sought by Native Peoples around the globe.
The approach would revolve around two key principles: conjoint
sovereignty and mandated easements, both of which are discussed in
greater detail infra after first clarifying what the term "reconciliation"
truly means.
1. Defining True Reconciliation
Australian Native Peoples and government ministers alike have
often deemed "reconciliation" as the ultimate end-point in Native/Non-
Native relations, so it is assumably an implicit goal of any alternative
approach to managing Native Title. Notably, however,
"reconciliation" is only once mentioned in Mabo274 and not at all in
273. See CRWA, supra note 270, § 22(5).
274. See Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 1.
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Ward, suggesting that it has never been on the High Court's collective
mind. Part of this stems from the fact that "reconciliation" is not a
legal phrase and represents something that transcends the Court.
Instead, "reconciliation" is a state of being which will have occurred
when the challenges of Native/Non-Native relations in the present
time fully and fundamentally address the mistakes of the past and a
system is put in place which solidly ensures the basis of a productive,
fruitful future relationship. Only then can one be assured that
problems surrounding such issues as Native Title will be overcome.
The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation has held that
reconciliation "in the end" involves attaining a "situation ... where
[the] ancient, subtly creative Aboriginal culture exists in friendship
alongside the non-Aboriginal culture" and becomes "a matter of pride
not only for all Australians but for all humankind. '"7* The Council
further notes how true reconciliation needs to transcend the law in
that it will operate in "all sectors, public and private ' 276 and involves
eight key elements:
(1) [Achieving] a greater understanding of the importance of the
land and sea in Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (ATSI)
society;
(2) [E]stablishing better relationships between Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Peoples and the wider community;
(3) Recogni[zing] that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
cultures are a valued part of Australian heritage;
(4) [Creating] a sense for all Australians of a shared ownership of
their history;
(5) [Ensuring] a greater awareness of the causes of disadvantage
that prevent Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander [Pleoples
from achieving fair and proper standards in health, housing,
employment, and education;
(6) [Stimulating] a greater community response to addressing the
underlying causes that currently give rise to the unacceptably
high levels of custody for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
[P]eoples;
275. MAKING THINGS RIGHT, supra note 220, at 3.
276. Id. at 4.
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(7) [Clreating greater opportunities for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Peoples to control their destinies;
(8) Agree[ing] on whether the process of [R]econciliation would be
advanced by a document of [RIeconciliation.
27 7
These, at the very least, require one to journey beyond the "path
of least resistance"2 s and establish new inroads both in the law and,
more important, the implications of the law.
279
2. Defining The Vision: Two Key Components & Five Affected
Areas
An alternative approach to managing Native Title can help
achieve these goals, inasmuch as it serves as a catalyst for other
reconciliation efforts. As summarized in Exhibit 11,20 the approach
imbues a fundamental respect of Native Peoples and Native Title by
recognizing Native sovereignty over land conjointly with the Crown
and ensures that the current non-Native systems of land ownership
and lease guarantees are solidly maintained through a system of
mandatory easements. These seemingly simple principles have
profound consequences that cannot be completely and fully addressed
here. However, there are five key areas that are affected and these
areas deserve greater discussion. Ultimately, it is hoped that this
framework will serve as a springboard for further discussions about
better formulating Native Title, achieving reconciliation, and
establishing the prerequisites for fulfilling Mabo's vision.
The first two areas affected are those of sovereignty and Native
Title, which work in close tandem with one another. As noted above,
the new approach to Native Title replaces the current system's
reliance on one sovereign (i.e., the Crown) with that of two sovereigns,
the Crown and Native Peoples. It is important to note that the two
are seen as conjoint sovereigns specifically over land, meaning that
they share sovereignty equally over property issues and that one
277. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
278. KENNETH MADDOCK, ANTHROPOLOGY, LAW AND THE DEFINITION OF AuSTRALIAN
ABORIGINAL RIGHTS TO LAND 185 (1980).
279. These eight goals illustrate the inevitability of ensuring that social relations
(e.g., Native interests and non-Native interests), economic interests (e.g., who has
control over land assets), and political systems (e.g., who has authority to make
decisions) must all be addressed in ensuring true reconciliation.
280. Exhibit 11, noted in the Appendix (summarizing the five key areas and their
effects under both the current Native Title regime and an alternative regime based on
conjoint sovereignty with mandated easements).
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cannot trump the other. The imports of this approach, which are
most readily apparent in the effects on Native Title, are not that non-
Native Title ceases to exist; but rather that Native Title is
reformulated as something that is not necessarily fee simple (i.e.,
expunging all other claims) and cannot be expunged by other claims.
Instead, Native Title is accorded its due by being fully non-
expugnable, though then subject to the mandatory imposition of other
land claims via mandatory easements backed by the Crown. In these
regards Native Title is not something that is "given" to Native Peoples
at the Crown's behest and beneficence, but something Native People
deserve and retain by virtue of their inherent, original authority over
the land. The Crown's sovereignty, however, has import in the extent
to which it can impose its will on Native Title by ensuring that its
claims, through its leases, carry full import while reflecting the
interests of non-Native Peoples under its authority.
The third area is conflict and problem management, which the
new system treats as an opportunity to build greater ties between
Native and non-Native peoples rather than an impediment to be
avoided. Unlike the current regime, which has sought to eliminate
RTN in light of protracted zero-sum negotiations based on whether
Native Peoples "get" Native Title, the new approach requires non-
Native and Native Peoples to sit down together and negotiate how
they will jointly manage their rights and responsibilities. Given the
Crown's sovereignty, non-Native peoples can be rest assured that
their core rights cannot be extinguished or eliminated by Native Title.
On the other hand, Native Peoples have the authority to discuss the
ways these rights are enacted or possibly waived in the Native
Peoples' interests. This "give and take" would be subjected to ADR
methods, resulting in mandatory arbitration, if necessary. This
approach is far superior to the current system which pits Natives
versus non-Natives in a seemingly never ending battle. In these
ways, the imports of leases and the mandated easements would not
281
necessarily imply the results of Strate v. A-1 Contractors in the
United States, in which a local Indian Tribe's granting an easement to
the States for a road is assumed to eliminate the Tribe's jurisdiction
over the road (i.e., making it "alienated, non-Indian land")28 2 for
281. Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
282. Id. at 454; see also at 440 (discussing the other instances in which the court has
considered how other easements, for "non member governance purposes" can also be
considered alienated, non-Indian land).
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"nonmember governance purposes.""8 3  Once Native Peoples'
sovereignty is recognized, jurisdiction, even in the face of mandated
leases, does not "shut out" Native Peoples from having a say in the
ways in which both their needs and the needs of non-Native
leaseholders can be jointly addressed and recognized.
The fourth and fifth areas affected by the new approach address
the security of leases with mandated easements, allaying the fears of
non-Native Peoples who perceive that conjoint sovereignty over the
land implies ceding power and authority instead of sharing power and
authority. In essence, the current system allows the Crown to grant
leases which can be used to extinguish Native Title, rendering moot
the concept of Native Title. Conversely, the alternative approach
codifies and guarantees lease rights under the aegis of a system that
superimposes them on Native Title lands. Non-Native Peoples can
therefore be fundamentally assured of their ability to rely on the
terms of their leases. Similarly, Native Peoples can rely on the fact
that they will be able to discuss and address their needs, which in
most cases can likely coexist with the leaseholders. As the third area
discussed supra makes clear, however, ADR methods will be solidly in
place to ensure that disputed issues are worked out in the most
amicable way possible. Again, avoiding situations that lend
themselves to creating only winners and losers defeats the purpose of
any scheme that has reconciliation as an ultimate goal. The following
sections shed additional light on the each of these five areas.
3. Areas 1 & 2: Sovereignty and Native Title
The import of conjoint sovereignty in the new approach to
conceiving Native Title cannot be understated. Economists and legal
theoreticians alike have echoed discussions about sovereignty and its
importance in the affairs of all Peoples, especially Native Peoples.8 4
In Mabo, the import of sovereignty was essential in confirming the
"radical" title off of which the Native Title was based. In its opinion,
the Court notes that on annexation, the Crown's sovereignty enabled
it to achieve:
tenure and a concomitant of sovereignty. As a sovereign enjoys
supreme legal authority in and over a territory, the sovereign has
power to prescribe what parcels of land and what interests in those
283. Id.
284. See Stephen Cornell, Sovereignty, Prosperity and Policy in Indian Country
Today, 5 COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT 5 (1997), reprinted in MFIL, supra note 236, at
721-28 (referring to a "nation building concept" for economic development).
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parcels should be enjoyed by others and what parcels of land should
285be kept as the sovereign's beneficial demesne.
The Court thus described the nature of a "pure legal estate to
which beneficial rights may or may not be attached" at the behest of
281the Sovereign. In this way, the aboriginal title continued as a
burden on the Crown's radical title.21' Because Native Sovereignty
would conjointly exist with Crown Sovereignty in the new approach,
however, Native Title has no burden and thus no extinguishing effects
on Crown Title which would now be free of the need for reversion.
8
In these ways, the concept of conjoint sovereignty is a novel
reformulation, which is neither impossible nor unattainable, contrary
to Chief Justice Brennan's fears. In Wik, Chief Justice Brennan notes
that it is "too late now to develop a new theory of land law that would
throw the whole structure of land title based on Crown Grants into
confusion."2' 9 This would, prima facie, suggest that the concept of
conjoint sovereignty would not withstand judicial scrutiny. On the
other hand, the concept of conjoint land authority is nothing new.
Just as alluvial titles could easily "stand outside the feudal system,
'29°
coexisting as a matter of right with freehold titles, Native Titles
would be based only on conjoint land-based sovereignty, suggesting
that the "sovereignty" being addressed is limited to some extents (and
"outside" the general system).' This could arguably (and ideally)
expand over time as Australia comes closer to achieving true
reconciliation. The following paragraphs serve to elucidate how this
is possible by debunking key challenges, addressing key prerequisites,
defining new approaches, outlining operational issues, and
highlighting the key benefits of using conjoint sovereignty to build a
new Native Title system.
a. Debunking Challenges
While these observations address Chief Justice Brennan's doubts
about reformulating sovereignty, they fail to address some larger
285. Mabo v. Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 50.
286. Cassidy, supra note 50, at 50 (quoting Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern
Nigeria, 2 A.C. 399, (1921)).
287. See Mabo, 175 CLR 1.
288. See id. 1$ 81, 89.
289. Wik v. Queensland (1996) 134 ALR 637.
290. Cassidy, supra note 50, at 47.
291. See Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. B. REV. 727, 759-
60 (1987), construed in Cassidy, supra note 50, at 47 n.56.
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challenges, three of which must be discussed and rebuffed. First,
sovereignty has traditionally been seen as the embodiment of state
power, otherwise termed the "act of state" doctrine.292 This doctrine
holds that only nation-states can have legal "rights and duties'2 93 to
their "Peoples." Second, sovereignty has traditionally required
"organization," such that a group of disorganized individuals (often
termed "primitive" in historical parlance) cannot exercise it. 2 94 Third,
consistent with the traditional English view espoused by William
Blackstone, sovereignty is by its very nature derived "of necessity"
from "one supreme, irresistible, absolute, uncontrolled authority"
295
such that if an entity was not alone or subjected to any controls
whatsoever, then it would no longer be "sovereign."
Each of these can be readily rebuffed. First, if nation states are
the locus of the legal rights and responsibilities to their Peoples, it
stands to reason they can also choose to share these rights and
responsibilities with other Peoples, such that their sovereignty is
jointly shared by more than one People. Second, it is well understood
that anthropologists have debunked the naive notion that Australian
Native Peoples are (and were) disorganized: rather, they are
"organized" differently from non-Native Peoples through patrilineal
descent groups and Songline management authorities.296 Lastly, if an
authority is truly "supreme" and "absolute," then it should stand to
reason that the authority could choose to share its supremacy. Thus,
the "supremacy" remains intact, albeit shared conjointly between two
sovereigns. The fact that only conjoint sovereignty over the land is
being exercised in the new scheme gives those rejecting a conjoint
formulation the chance to envision it as a means of a sovereign's
297
sharing power with a group under the sovereign's aegis. This,
however, can be rebuffed based on the simple historical reality that
one cannot say that Britain ever truly exercised sovereignty over
Australia's massive geographic expanse.' 98 More aptly, Britain
292. Henry Reynolds, Sovereignty, in CITIZENSHIP AND INDIGENOUS AUSTRALIANS:
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS AND POSSIBILITIES 208, 209 (1998) [hereinafter CHANGING
CONCEPTIONS].
293. Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global
Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 98 (1999).
294. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS, supra note 292.
295. Id.
296. See discussion supra Part IV.A. (discussing Native People's understandings of
the land).
297. See Wiessner, supra note 293, at 122.
298. See Australia Surveying, supra note 16.
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exercised sovereignty over small populated areas and only had a
"sphere of influence" in the outlying areas.29 9 The concept of conjoint
sovereignty can therefore overcome any need, real or imagined, to
require "assimilation" of a People. °0
In summary, redefining sovereignty as a conjoint relation enables
one to overcome the traditionally entrenched doctrines of
international and, by extension, English law. "Largely discredited"
due to the extent to which they were used to "entrench the dominance
of colonial interests" and led to the "subordination of Indigenous
rights,"' it is time these laws are undone. Recognizing conjoint
302
sovereignty over land is a start.
b. Addressing prerequisites
The problems with conjoint sovereignty discussed above stem
largely from three key prerequisites" of sovereignty that were
traditionally assumed. However, these three "prerequisites" are
neither necessary nor important. In essence, these threeSr 7303
prerequisites, as reiterated by Justice Burton in R. v. Murrell ,
required that a group of individuals attain a "point of numbers and
civilization, and to such a form of Government of laws, as to be
entitled to be recognized30 4 as a sovereign state.
The first criterion, numbers, was rejected by jurists and theorists
as early as 1873 because they found that Australian Native Peoples
were quite sufficient in numbers to manage their affairs."' Modern
governments have found that often there need not be vast numbers of
299. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS, supra note 292, at 211.
300. Tim Rowse, Indigenous Citizenship and Self-determination: The Problem of
Shared Responsibilities, in CHANGING CONCEPTIONS, supra note 292, 81-84.
301. HEATHER MCRAE ET AL., INDIGENOUS LEGAL ISSUES 139 (1997).
302. It is important to distinguish between this idea and the Aboriginal reserves,
which had been set-aside on pastoral reserves in the 1850s as a form of 'Joint"
ownership. First, these lands were often simply "set asides" which involved little, if
any, say from the Native Peoples regarding where they were or how they were
managed. Second, there was the fact that Native Peoples were not used to staying in
one place. As hunters and gatherers, and particularly in light of the demand for their
labor, they left. The concept of conjoint sovereignty transcends this concept on far
more fundamental and significant levels. See HEATHER GOODALL, INVASION TO
EMBASSY: LAND IN ABORIGINAL POLITICS IN NEW SOUTH WALES, 1770-1972 53 (1996)
(discussing the pastoral reserve experiments with Native Peoples in the 1850s).
303. Murrell, (1836) I Legge 72.
304. Id., construed in THREE NATIONS, supra note 4, 40 (emphasis added).
305. See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES OF JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1873); see also CHRISTIAN
WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS (Clarendon Press ed., 1934).
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individuals to justify granting them control, as Canada's decision to
306
set aside over 1,900,000 km2 of land for 20,490 Inuit illustrates.
The second criterion, civilization, had been largely supported by
modi opperandi dating back to Cicero. However, a Grand Jury in
South Australia in 1847 held that "all the Native Tribes [in
Australia] ... fare] in a situation to make laws and to adopt usages
for their own protection and Government. °7 This suggested that
even the Australian public found the Native Peoples were not
"uncivilized." Modern anthropologists would support this conclusion
as well.
Finally, the third criterion, independence,3 0 8 could be simply met
by Australian Native Peoples by virtue of their obvious independence
before Britain's arrival in 1788, something Burton readily admitted
himself. At issue in Burton's calculus was the fact that Britain did
not see the Native Peoples as independent. Instead, Britain applied
the terra nullius doctrine. If, however, this doctrine has been
discarded by Australia's own High Court in Mabo, then Australia's
Native Peoples were not only independent when Britain arrived, but
still arguably have vestiges of independence to the degree in which
they see themselves as independent today. Recognizing conjoint
sovereignty vis-a-vis land would then recognize this very fact.
c. Defining Approaches
If conjoint sovereignty passes the requisite tests and debunks key
challenges to its legitimacy, the next key step is determining how it
should be approached (i.e., whether it could or should be embraced by
the Courts, the legislature, or referenda) and in what order.
Consideration of these routes suggests there probably needs to be a
combination of approaches, with the legislature first approving
conjoint sovereignty over land via regulations, the People of Australia
then confirming their approval in a referendum (with an appropriate
constitutional amendment), and the courts lastly clarifying the
meaning and import of conjoint sovereignty as it is incorporated into
the common law. While the first two efforts would undoubtedly
306. See Nunavut, available at http://www.canadainfolink.ca/nunavut.htm (last
visited Nov. 29, 2003) (containing maps and information about Nunavut).
307. THREE NATIONS, supra note 4, at 40-41.
308. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1936). "Independence"
has been largely used to depict Burton's third criterion requiring individuals to be
able to "form a Government of laws," which came to be a dominant test used by
foreign powers to see if they could exert their sovereignty.
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require significant effort and public relations expertise, they could
succeed if well managed.
The order of these stages noted above makes sense given that the
initiative of conjoint sovereignty is so new. Australian Courts have
essentially determined the matter of Native Sovereignty is not only
closed, but is "beyond inquiry" because "[eixtensions of sovereignty,..
. are matters of international, not domestic law, ' 9 and "acquisition of
territory is a prerogative of the Crown which cannot be questioned by
the courts."3 '10 Because conjoint sovereignty at its core requires the
sharing of power, the polity itself must approve that power. The
Courts, by following the directive that they are prevented from
adopting "rules that accord with contemporary notions of justice and
human rights if their adoption would fracture the skeleton of principle
which gives the body of our law its shape and internal consistency
11
would thus see the public as the locus of control. There is also the
simple fact that since Native sovereignty would not be unbridled, (i.e.,
it would exist only in relation to land), the legislature would also need
to clearly iterate these constraints. This would apply to the need for
the legislature to elucidate additional guidelines vis-A-vis Native
Title, such as those in Delgamuukw requiring that First Nation
Peoples have a "continuous connection" with their land.3 It would
also allow the needed debate for clarifying how to manage Native
People's claims, requiring more than simply recognizing Native Title
of all Australia in a quasi-Nunavut formulation.313
309. THREE NATIONS, supra note 4, at xvi. Reynolds also quotes Patrick Macklern as
saying that "a relationship between sovereigns was a relation of equality in which
each views itself and the other as independent and distinct." Id. at 178. He also
references H. Hannum as noting that "political loyalty to an existing state does not
necessarily imply national or cultural disloyalty," appearing to divorce the issue of
culture from state management. H. HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION 454 (1990), construed in THREE NATIONS, supra note 4, at 179.
310. THREE NATIONS, supra note 4, at xvi (explaining partly why judges always have
dodged some of the most important legal-not to mention moral and political -issues
confronting Australia).
311. Mabo v. Queensland [No 21 (1992) 175 CLR 29, construed in Legg, supra note 49,
at 402 n.79.
312. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [19971 3 S.C.R. 1010.
313. The Nunavut formulation would not work for many reasons, not the least which
include the facts that (a) the Inuit see themselves as a unified "people" while
Australian Native Peoples comprise an array of groups, (b) the Inuit were more
focused on a "way of life" and fewer links to the land, per se, (c) the Nunavut's
economics of fishing are disparate from Australia's focus on minerals and ore in
predominantly Native areas, and (d) Canadians attitudes towards Inuit and other
20031
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
One legislative process recognizing conjoint sovereignty could
involve a treaty, either between the Commonwealth or individual
STGs. Such a treaty could be wrought with each of the individual
Aboriginal Districts integrally involved in voting and selecting
representatives to ATSIC.314  Power would therefore not be
monolithically concentrated, reflecting the plurality of Native Peoples;
it would stem from a political division that, while imperfect, has some
history. If Native Peoples, State legislatures, and the Commonwealth
perceived a new approach was needed (e.g., full-scale referenda
among Native Peoples), then this could be readily pursued.
d. Outlining Operations: What, How, and Where
Once such a new Native Title system was approved by the polity
and introduced based on the principles of conjoint sovereignty with
mandatory easements, three key questions need to be answered.
First, what processes would be used to determine the nature of Native
Title Holders' needs subjected to ADR? Second, how would these
processes be implemented, especially in terms of ensuring sensitivity
among the implementers? Lastly, where would jurisdictions exist for
the processes to take place? Preliminary answers to each question
follow, providing a framework for one possible regime.
One of the key challenges in defining the processes determining
Native Title holders' needs is ensuring their sensitivity to Native
Peoples' cultural practices and what processes should be used to
ensure this sensitivity. The Court in Delgamuukw found that oral
evidence was central to determining Native People's claims. In
Australia, however, while it is true that most evidence would be
transmitted orally, it is also true that doing so could be tantamount to
blasphemy. "15 There is also the concern that the Dreaming and
Eskimos are largely positive, while Australia's relationship with its Native Peoples
has been marked by significant social and political tension. Maureen Tehan,
Customary Title, Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging
Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 765 (1998)
(noting there were over 500 language groups in Australia at the time of
colonialization and Indigenous Australians saw land as a source of laws, customs, and
identity, representing a "complex of meaning which [will] explain the universe."). Id.
at 771-72; see also Matthew C. Miller, An Australian Nunavut? A Comparison of Inuit
and Aboriginal Rights Movements in Canada and Australia, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
1175 (1988); see also Nunavut, supra note 306.
314. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 200, at 14 (illustrating the
locations and names of the 36 Aboriginal Districts which currently comprise ATSIC).
315. See THE SONGLINES, supra note 159; see also John Basten, Recent Developments
in Native Title Law and Practice: Issues for the High Court, in 2 LAND, RIGHTS, LAWS:
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Songline information being "handed over" is intellectual property, 3' 6
which would require effective protections 17  These concerns
underscore the need for confidentiality, the involvement of individuals
who are aware of and can communicate key concerns without
breaching confidentiality, and defining processes that ensure the
sanctity of any negotiations and discussions that transpire.
In addition to determining what processes should be used, the
next question is how they should be introduced. A patent disconnect
seems to exist between recognizing Native Peoples' spiritual
"connection" to the land while framing it as a legal "right" under the
rubric of "Native Title." One solution to this quandary is ensuring
that ADR processes are carried out under the aegis of an "Indigenous
order,'318 reflecting the degree to which the processes are those
created by Native Peoples themselves. In other words, the processes,
while involving Native and non-Native Peoples alike, would be co-
managed and co-overseen by Native Peoples. This theoretically
should not pose a problem to non-Native peoples to the extent in
which the decision-making authority (inasmuch as it exists via ADR
methods) is neither controlled nor centralized in any Native or non-
ISSUES OF NATIVE TITLE 1 (2002), available at http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/
rsrch/ntru/ntpapers/ipv2nl3.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2003) (writing that "revelation
of the knowledge in a manner that is unlawful according to traditional law would
destroy the significance and character of sites and... damage... the land."). But see
Nathan Hancock, Is This the Spanish Inquisition?: Legal Procedure, Traditional
Secrets, and the Public Interest, in HERITAGE AND NATIVE TITLE: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 91 (1996).
316. Srividha Ragavan, Protection of Traditional Knowledge, 2 MINN. INTELL. PROP.
REV. 1 (2001) (discussing what can constitute intellectual property).
317. See Kristin Ann Mattiske, Recognition of Indigenous Heritage in the Modern
World: U.S. Legal Protection in Light of International Custom, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
1105 (2002) (detailing how the United States has pursued the goal of protecting
Indigenous heritage in Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act
(NAGPRA) in light of international standards in the (a) Hague Convention, (b) 1970
United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of
Cultural Property, (c) 1972 UNESCO Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage, (d) International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law (UNIDROIT) Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, (e) International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention no. 169, and (f) the
Draft United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
318. See WILLIAM SANDERS, TOWARDS AN INDIGENOUS ORDER OF AUSTRALIAN
GOVERNMENT: RETHINKING SELF-DETERMINATION AS INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS POLICY 3-16
(2002), available at http://eprints.anu.edu.au/archive/00001111/00/2002-DP230.pdf
(last visited Oct. 29, 2003).
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Native "authority" per se. Instead, Native Peoples could manage
facilitating bodies, much as executive appointees manage different
administrative agencies. Such attempts have been made in
Canada,19 as well as in Australia with ATSIC, a Commonwealth
Government Body.320  This may require Australia to embrace a
philosophy of "Self-Governance" towards Native Peoples, which
transcends the concepts of "Self-Determination," "Self-Management,"
and "Self-Empowerment" previously attempted.321
The third and final question addresses the issue of where
jurisdictions would exist for the processes in place, forcing one to ask
if the current ATSIC model fits Native Peoples' needs. 2  For these
purposes, probably the best system would be that which confirms the
acceptance of Native Peoples' conjoint sovereignty in the first place.
Indeed, whatever jurisdictional model is used to formalize the conjoint
sovereignty of the Crown and Native Peoples is essentially the form
that should be employed in redressing past injuries, affirming and
protecting key rights, and starting down the road to self-
323determination and self-government.
e. Highlighting Key Benefits
The benefits of a new system to Native Title based on conjoint
sovereignty are potentially immense. First and foremost, the new
system would enable Native and non-Native peoples to avoid
litigation 324 and employ more robust, non-adversarial systems, taking
to heart the fundamental question from Delgamuukw: "[I]f everyone
agrees the issues should be negotiated, why are they still going to
319. Id. While Courts have still facilitated many claims, administrative departments
have been established, such as in British Columbia, to oversee efforts to clarify
Native Title over many Native Lands. Id. at 9.
320. Id. at 7.
321. See Exhibit 3, supra note 90.
322. See AUSTRALIAN BUREAU OF STATISTICS, supra note 200, at 14.
323. See G. Clark, A New Relationship with the Federation, in ATSIC NEWS, Feb.
2001; see also Ravi de Costa, Treaty Now? First, A Closer Look at the British
Columbia Treaty Process, 5 INSTITUTE FOR SOcIAL RESEARCH (ISR) WORKING PAPERS
SERIES 1 (2002) (highlighting key observations and take-a-ways from British
Columbia's attempts to forge a treaty with its First Nation Peoples).
324. See Geoffrey R. Schiveley, Negotiation and Native Title: Why Common Law
Courts are not Proper Fora for Determining Native Land Title Issues, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 427 (2000) (arguing that the common law courts are inappropriate fora
to determine Native Title claims due to their creating "inherent constraints on their
[own] ability to deal with the problems raised by issues of native rights.").
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court? ,325 To date, Courts have been the only places where Native
Peoples have been able to turn because of Native Peoples' inability to
exercise sovereignty over their land or have their sovereignty
recognized. Transcending the Courts would enable Native and non-
Native People to discard flawed processes which require trying to
convince judges the merits of different "sides"326 when the judges have
little or no connection to the given cases, halt the current erosion of
Native Title by implicitly reinvigorating the RDA, and establish a
more consistent approach 3 7 which results in saner, more just
outcomes.12s  There is, finally, the ultimate benefit of invalidating
extinguishment as an option, notwithstanding constitutional
arguments to its use.29
4. Area 3: Problem/Conflict Management
As noted above and in Exhibit 11, the area of conflict
management is a locus of significant change and improvement over
the current system, though this does not suggest it will be easy.
While the RTN was largely eschewed by the NTAA due to its
demands on peoples' time and resources, one cannot expect the new
325. Id. at 467.
326. Meyers & Raine, supra note 44, at 110.
327. Particularly in contrast to the Native Title Act (i.e., post-Native Title
Amendment Act) with rights to notice, comment, and negotiation interspersed
inconsistently throughout.
328. See Heidi Kai Guth, Dividing the Catch: Natural Resource Reparations to
Indigenous Peoples -Examining the Maori Fisheries Settlement, 24 U. HAW. L. REV.
179, 180 (2001). While not writing about land claim settlements, per se, Heidi Kai
Guth notes how the Maori people benefited from a close relationship with the New
Zealand government in facing the challenge of assigning values to resources, which
often "cannot just be assigned a present monetary or quantitative value." Ultimately,
they were able to jointly "define [the resources] in a manner that both examine[d]
how [the Maori] lived at the time of cultural impact and incorporate[d] contemporary
realities and desires." Id.
329. The main constitutional argument against extinguishment is based on
Australian Constitution s 116, which bars the government from preventing one from
exercising one's religion and, unlike in the United States, has never been tested. See
Helen Grutzner, Invalidating Provisions of the Native Title Act of 1993 on Religious
Grounds: Section 116 of the Constitution and the Freedom to Exercise Indigenous
Spiritual Beliefs, in JUSTICE FOR ALL? NATIVE TITLE IN THE AUSTRALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM
85 (2001). In the United States, Indians have failed in their attempts to stop the
government from taking religiously obtrusive action. See Lyng v. N.W. Cemetery
Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988).
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approach to result in decreasing the time spent negotiating claims.
One of the main problems with the RTN was the fact that it was not
focused over how land could best be shared, but instead over who got
the land and subsequently won. This led individuals to enter
negotiations strongly pitted against one another, as opposed to
attempting to work with one another. Under the new system, the
issues on the table will be far less onerous and far more amenable to
agreement. By ensuring,"' as was highlighted in Delgamuukw and
noted supra, that Native Peoples' oral evidence is accorded weight, it
is inevitable that negotiators, mediators, and arbitrators will be
better aware of the challenges they face. 2 Evidence of the limited
success of Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs), as opposed to
Native Title Claims, suggests the value of working towards joint
agreements if the parties are willing and able to do so. 3 3 The fact
that supplemental mediation will be needed between Native Peoples
themselves,334 each having conflicting needs depending on the
Songlines and Dreamings which pass through certain lands, will
furthermore serve to build (or rebuild) bridges between Native
Peoples' communities which would otherwise be strained. Ultimately,
the main goal is building processes which, by virtue of the fact they
are jointly used by Native and non-Native peoples and are not
330. Therefore, fast tracking negotiations, even though there may be only "limited
effects," is thus not an option; though the fact that it is no longer a zero-sum game
reduces its need. See Native Title Summary, supra note 38.
331. See Richard Bradshaw, Negotiating Exploration and Mining Agreements Under
the Native Title Act, in THE SKILLS OF NATIVE TITLE PRACTICE 114, 116-123 (1995)
(noting the need for rules and guidelines in any arbitration or mediation proceedings,
though these rules should be unduly burdensome and excessive).
332. See Peter Sutton, The Relative Strengths of Oral and Written Evidence, in PROOF
AND MANAGEMENT OF NATIVE TITLE 20, 21 (1994); see also Nonie Sharp, No ORDINARY
JUDGMENT: MABO, THE MURRAY ISLANDERS' LAND CASE 103-114 (1996) (discussing the
challenges of admitting hearsay in Mabo).
333. See National Native, supra note 66 (containing a map detailing IULUAs across
Australia); but see id. (Geographic Extent of Claimant Applications as per Register of
Native Title Claims map detailing the comparative failure of the Native Title
system); see also id. (Determinations of Native Title map).
334. The "beneficial incidents" of Native Title for different Native Peoples will differ
from group to group. Thus, the groups must sit down together and, with arbitrators,
mediators, & negotiators, confirm what things should "count" and "matter" (e.g., as is
often done between groups comprising large labor unions).
335. See Fred Chaney, Mediation Between Different Indigenous Groups As Part of the
Broader Mediation Process, in WORKING WITH THE NATIVE TITLE ACT: ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ADVERSARIAL METHOD 93 (1997).
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governed by a zero-sum game, develop the spirit which moves the
parties closer to reconciliation.
5. Areas 4 & 5: Pastoral Lease & Easement Security
In summary, the fact that the new approach mandates easements
on given lands helps ensure that non-Native Peoples' fears are laid to
rest. At its core, the new approach is based on a fundamental tenet
that collective and individual rights of Native and non-Native Peoples
can coexist and both receive the security they demand and deserve.Y
Mandated easements, in particular, address the needs of miners who
have often felt "ignored" in what they considered the "excessive size of
land grants" to Native Peoples.31 So, too, would mandated easements
address the needs of Pastoralists, concerned that the tracts on which
they have built their livelihoods will continue to be able to serve their
herding needs for future generations. The current system, which
presents the stark choice of either giving the Native People sole access
to the lands (barring the pastoralists) or honoring the pastoralists'
leases (ignoring the Native People's needs), is no choice at all.
Making a multiple-choice question of "Aboriginal land rights," which
Henry Reynolds describes as the "oldest question in Australian
politics,, 3  undeniably fails to accord the question its due.
V. CONCLUSION
Australia's inability to realize the import of Native Title and
Mabo's vision has been ascribed in the preceding pages to a failure of
the High Court to clearly define what Native Title means. In all
fairness, however, it also stems from Australia's inability to define
itself. One can argue persuasively that in its very short history as a
Nation, celebrating its Centenary in 2001, Australia has been forced
to grow up quickly. Now a vibrant, multicultural democracy, it has
been forced onto the world stage still not sure of its identity. Surely,
its British heritage has served it well, though not in a current world
336. See Leighton McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist, 22 MELB.
U. L. REv. 310, 329-30 (1998) (detailing how Kymlicka's theory of minority rights
requires secure and meaningful cultural contexts so individuals "can adequately
determine how to live their lives.") Id. The same can hold true for the majority, as
well.
337. J. P. NIEUWENHUYSEN, ABORIGINAL LAND RIGHTS AND INDUSTRY / INFORMATION
PAPER No. 4, 18 (1980).
338. Henry Reynolds, Address at the National Library of Australia (Oct. 21, 1986).
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in which twenty-five percent of its population was born abroad, 339 a
percentage likely only to increase at current immigration levels.
Furthermore, its relationship to its Native Peoples remains
amorphous: on the one hand, it seems to want to embrace the scars of
its past; on the other hand, it wants to run away.
The recent Howard government has notably refused to apologize
to Native Peoples on behalf of Australia for what occurred, 340 and
arguably continues to occur, on the basis that the current government
is not responsible for the past. Historian Keith Windschuttle argues
that "Australia's historical establishment... has largely fabricated
and mythologized the notion that British settlement of Australia from
the late 18th century was a story of genocide of its indigenous
people" 41 often "inventing large scale killings of Aborigines that never
occurred.'42 Now that it appears Australians are not even sure about
the past, or possibly want to run away from the past, at the very least
one wonders if Australia can simply focus instead on the realities of
the present: addressing the fact that Native Peoples are increasingly
being denied access to lands they held before any European settlers
arrived. These facts are not in dispute.
It is ultimately hoped that the ideas in this paper, in particular
the new approach toward Native Title claims employing conjoint
sovereignty and mandated easements, will be viewed as "thought-
starters" for future consideration, debate, and discussion. Surely,
there will be no easy answers; but one thing is certain: either a
solution will be found, or Native Peoples will cease to be. In these
339. See Exhibit 14, supra note 248.
340. See Australia's Aborigines: A Dispute over Mistake Creek, THE ECONOMIST, Dec.
14, 2002, at 37.
341. Id. See KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE, THE FABRICATION OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY:
VOLUME I-VAN DIEMAN'S LAND 1803-1847 (2002). But see Editorial, The Other
Australia, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 17, 2000, at 18 (admonishing Australia for its
treatment of Native Peoples and recounting horrors in its history); see also Ben
Kiernan, Australia's Aboriginal Genocides, THE BANGKOK POST, Sept. 10, 2000
(referencing "ethnic cleansing" and "transit camps" which the government set up in
its quest to better manage Australia's Native Peoples); see also PHILLIP KNIGHTLEY,
AUSTRALIA: BIOGRAPHY OF A NATION (2000) (containing a chapter entitled "Black
Australia" drawing parallels between the Holocaust and what occurred to Australia's
Native Peoples); see also HENRY REYNOLDS, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE FRONTIER (1981)
(detailing Aboriginal injustices for the first time in significant detail).
342. Gleebooks, Inc., Book Review (reviewing KEITH WINDSCHUTTLE, THE FABRICATION
OF ABORIGINAL HISTORY: VOLUME I-VAN DIEMAN'S LAND 1803-1847 (2002)), available
at http://www.gleebooks.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
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regards, High Court Justice Michael Kirby's3 43 reflections on equal
rights and Australia's Native Peoples at the Opening Ceremonies of
Gay Games VI on November 5, 2002, carry significant resilience:
We began our modern history by denying the existence of our
indigenous peoples and their rights .... We have not corrected all
these wrongs. But we are surely on the road to enlightenment.
There will be no U-turns .... [T]he movement for equality is
unstoppable... in the end, inclusion will replace exclusion ....
For the sake of the planet and of humanity it must be so.
344
343. Justice Michael Kirby is the only openly gay justice on the High Court of
Australia-the only country in the world with an openly gay Justice on its highest
court. Notably, Justice Kirby was not open about his sexual orientation when he was
appointed to the High Court after serving as the UN Special Representative for
Human Rights in Cambodia, though he "came out" soon thereafter. See Michael
Kirby, Same Sex Relationships: Some Australian Legal Developments, 19 AUSTL. BAR
R. 1, 28 (1999).
344. Michael Kirby, Courage, Address at the Opening Ceremonies of Gay Games VI
(Nov. 5, 2002), available at http://www.us.altnews.com.au/print.php?sid=3728 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2003).
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ExHIBIT 15: NATIVE TITLE QUOTES
This is a fundamental test of our social goals and our national
will: our ability to say to ourselves and the rest of the world that
Australia is a first-rate social democracy .... The plight of
Aboriginal Australians affects us all .... The starting point might be
to recognize that the problem starts with non-Aboriginal Australians.
It begins with that act of recognition.
Recognition that it was we who did the dispossessing.
We took the traditional lands and smashed the traditional
way of life.
We brought the diseases...
We committed the murders.
We took the children from their mothers.
We practiced discrimination and exclusions.
It was our ignorance and our prejudice.
And our failure to imagine these things being done to us.
- Hon. Paul Keating, 24'h Prime Minister of Australia (Dec., 1991-
Mar., 1996) December 10, 1992'
Australians of this generation should not be required to accept the
guilt and blame for the past actions and policies over which they had
no control.
I would like to... strike a fair and decent balance in this very
difficult debate about... Native Title .... I think we all agree on one
thing and that is the sooner we get this debate over and get the whole
issue behind us, the better for all of us....
The nub of the problem is that... the High Court of Australia
significantly changed what had been the understanding of most people
about the law ....
I don't believe that endless amendment and debate is going to
produce more jobs, greater fairness, or greater certainty.
I believe that the time has come for us to fix this issue and to fix it
now.
Hon. John Howard, 2 5h Prime Minister of Australia (Mar.,
1996-Present) May 27, 1997 & November 30, 1997b
'Paul Keating, Address at the International Year for the World's Indigenous Peoples
celebration, (Dec. 10, 1992).
b First sentence from: Mr. Howard Unreconciled, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May 27,
1997, at 1; see John Howard, Address on ABC Television Concerning the Wik decision
and Native Title (Nov. 30, 1997); see also Daryl Williams, Attorney-General of
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In the decade since the High Court dismissed the legal fiction of
terra nullius in Mabo, it is painfully apparent that the process for
determining Native Title is costly, slow, and unwieldy...
The Native Title process has ... failed to deliver certainty to
Indigenous People, many of whom are still waiting to reap the benefits
they believed would flow from a recognition of their rights.
- Editorial, THE AGE-MELBOURNE
August 12, 2002'
Australia, Address to the Native Title Conference 2002 in Geraldton, WA, entitled
"Native Title: The Next 10 Years - Moving Forward by Agreement" (Sept. 4, 2002)
(echoing Howard's comments after the passage of the NTAA and additional changes
which need to be implemented).
'Editorial, A Better Way Needed on Native Title Claims, THE AGE-MELBOURNE, Aug.
12, 2002, at 10, available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2002/08/11/
1028158045754.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2003).
[Vol. 11.1
